KRELING v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY ET AL

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District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

KRELING v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY ET AL.

Civ. 14420.

Decided: March 28, 1944

Leo V. Youngworth, of Los Angeles, for petitioner. J. H. O'Connor, Co. Counsel, Douglas DeCoster, Deputy Co. Counsel, and Alfred Gitelson, all of Los Angeles, for respondents.

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Superior Court of Los Angeles County and Honorable Stanley Mosk, a Judge thereof, from hearing and trying three certain actions now pending in respondent Court, and in which actions petitioner herein appears as a party litigant.

For a detailed statement of the factual situation presented and the issues raised by this petition, see Kreling v. Superior Court, etc., 146 P.2d 935, wherein we ruled adversely to respondents upon their demurrer challenging the sufficiency of the petition herein as not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the issuance of a writ of prohibition; and wherein we also ruled upon respondents' motion to strike therefrom certain portions of the petition for a writ.

Upon the return day fixed by us in the Order to Show Cause why a peremptory writ of prohibition should not issue it was agreed that should respondent's demurrer be overruled, and after decision upon their motion to strike they should have additional time within which to file an answer to the petition for a writ.

The answer, as now filed, does not dispute the facts taken as they are from the transcript of proceedings had at the trial, and as recited in our opinion above mentioned wherein we ruled upon the demurrer and motion to strike. Judge Mosk does not deny the statements allegedly made by him of and concerning petitioner when rendering his decision upon the affirmative defense interposed in action numbered 483841. In fact, by his answer to the petition herein, he candidly admits having made the statements set forth in the petition for a writ.

It therefore follows that Judge Mosk having admittedly expressed an opinion as to the lack of credibility on the part of petitioner herein, the latter, for the reasons stated in Kreling v. Superior Court, etc., supra, is clearly entitled to the writ he seeks.

In directing the issuance of the writ, it is obvious that it should be confined in its application to the particular judge of the respondent Court whose disqualifications are herein passed upon.

Let the peremptory writ, as thus limited, issue.

WHITE, Justice.

YORK, P. J., and DORAN, J., concur.