CARPENTER, Insurance Com'r, v. GLENN–COLUSA IRR. DIST.*
This is an appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to an order sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff's amended complaint without leave to amend.
The amended complaint contains two causes of action, both of which seek to recover a money judgment against the defendant upon certain matured and unpaid bond interest coupons of the Williams Irrigation District. The first cause of action is for the coupons maturing January 1, 1933, to July 1, 1936, inclusive, and the second cause, for coupons maturing January 1, 1927, to July 1, 1932, inclusive, in the aggregate sum of $18,000.
From the record it appears that the Glenn–Colusa Irrigation District was organized in 1920, and in the year 1924, was enlarged to include the Williams Irrigation District, the consolidation being effective June 16, 1924. All of the coupons which are the subject of this action matured subsequent to such consolidation.
It is alleged that the plaintiff, in his official capacity, is the owner and holder of said coupons; that they were presented to the treasurer of the defendant district for payment; that demand was made therefor, and payment was by said treasurer refused; and that said coupons bear interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum from the date of presentation, under the provisions of section 52 of the California Irrigation District Act.
The question presented is whether the holder of matured bonds and coupons, after presentation and refusal of payment thereof, is entitled to a money judgment against the defendant district. This question appears definitely settled in the recent case of Moody v. Provident Irrigation District, 85 P.2d 128, 130, wherein the Supreme Court, adopting in substance the opinion of this court written by the late Mr. Justice Plummer, holds that the 1919 amendment of section 52, St.1919, p. 667, of the California Irrigation District Act, increasing the interest rate from 6 per cent to 7 per cent on matured bonds and coupons registered and not paid because of insufficiency of funds, constitutes a new agreement and tolls the statute of limitations until there is sufficient funds in the district treasury with which to pay the same, and notice thereof given. The court says: “It is clear that while it has been held in a number of cases prior to the amendment of section 52, supra, that a money judgment was proper to be entered against the district, and also necessary to prevent the bar of the statute after the lapse of four years, it is likewise clear that the entering of a money judgment against the district does not give to a bondholder any additional remedies in seeking to enforce payment on matured bonds and matured coupons. * The proceeding, being a purely idle act, and the entry of a money judgment by the trial court affording the plaintiff no additional rights or remedies, we think the court was correct in holding in substance that it should not be burdened with proceedings which would avail the plaintiff nothing.”
It follows that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer herein, and that the judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered.
STEEL, Justice pro tem., delivered the opinion of the court.
We concur: PULLEN, P.J.; THOMPSON, J.