CATHERINE ARNOLD APPELLANT v. THE HIBERNIA SAVINGS LOAN SOCIETY CORPORATION ET AL RESPONDENTS

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District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

CATHERINE N. ARNOLD, APPELLANT, v. THE HIBERNIA SAVINGS & LOAN SOCIETY (A CORPORATION) ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

AILEEN K. VAGER, APPELLANT, v. THE HIBERNIA SAVINGS & LOAN SOCIETY (A CORPORATION) ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

WELLS FARGO BANK & UNION TRUST CO (A BANKING CORPORATION), AS TRUSTEE, ETC., APPELLANT, v. THE HIBERNIA SAVINGS & LOAN SOCIETY (A CORPORATION) ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Civ. 11585, 11587, 11592.

Decided: July 23, 1942

M. Mitchell Bourquin, Keyes & Erskine, George Olshausen, Rosenshine, Hoffman, Davis & Martin, and Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, all of San Francisco, and Ross & Ross, of Redwood City, for appellants. Garret W. McEnerney and Tobin & Tobin, all of San Francisco, for respondents.

These three appeals are companion appeals to the appeals in Maguire v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Society et al., 128 P.2d 149, and related cases, which last–mentioned appeals have been considered in an opinion this day filed.

These three cases differ slightly from the Maguire and related cases heretofore considered. In these three cases, the final complaints contained but one count, which count was somewhat similar to the first count of the final complaint in the Maguire case. In other words, the complaints in these cases involved the claims of plaintiffs as alleged “members” of the membership corporation incorporated in 1864, which claims were based upon original deposits made by the predecessors of plaintiffs between 1859 and 1864. The only material difference between the allegations in the final complaints in these three cases and the allegations in the first count of the final complaint in the Maguire case is that the allegations in each of these final complaints show that there had been no continuous maintenance of a deposit.

It therefore follows that if the demurrer to the first count of the final complaint in the Maguire case was properly sustained, the demurrers to the final complaints in these three cases were likewise properly sustained. We held that the demurrer to said first count in the Maguire case was properly sustained and we therefore hold that said demurrers to the final complaints in these three cases were properly sustained for the reasons stated in the opinion in the Maguire case.

The judgments in the above–entitled cases are, and each of them is, affirmed.

SPENCE Justice.

NOURSE, P. J., and STURTEVANT, J., concurred.