IN RE: Evelyn S.

Reset A A Font size: Print

Court of Appeal, Second District, California.

IN RE: Evelyn S., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CATHY B. et al., Defendants and Appellants.

B223075

Decided: February 24, 2011

Catherine C. Czar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Cathy B. Jennifer Mack, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Michael S. Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Frank J. DaVanzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellants Cathy B. and Michael S. appeal the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders which found their children subject to dependency jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect) and (d) (sexual abuse), and removed the children from the custody of their parents.1  We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Cathy B. (Mother) is the mother of A.R. (A.), Evelyn S. and Elessa S.2 Michael S. (Father) is the father of Evelyn and Elessa and the stepfather of A.3 The family first came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in December 2009, during a period when Mother and Father were separated.   DCFS received a referral that the apartment in which Mother was living with the girls was dirty and cockroach-infested.   These allegations were deemed unfounded.   However, during the investigation, the caseworker learned that marijuana was being smoked in the apartment, and that Mother sometimes went away for days, dropping the girls at Father's home 4 or leaving them in the care of her roommate, Porchea.5  A. described a party thrown by Porchea while Mother was visiting neighbors where people were smoking marijuana, her friend was “ ‘beat up,’ ” and money was stolen.   Mother acknowledged that Porchea let “unsavory people,” including “delinquent teenagers,” into the apartment.   Both Mother and Porchea tested positive for cannabinoids.   No petition was filed, but Mother agreed to participate in voluntary family maintenance services.

Not long after implementation of the voluntary family maintenance plan, A. accused Father of having inappropriately touched and sexually propositioned her on one occasion in the past.6  Mother stated that A. had made a similar allegation in the summer of 2009, but that she (Mother) had not believed her at the time because A. was upset about the fact that Father had refused to give her money for clothing.   Mother had nonetheless told the girl “not [to] walk around the house in her panties, and to put on a robe.”   Mother further stated that she asked Father about the allegation and that Father denied it.   When interviewed by the caseworker for the detention report, Mother reported that she believed A.'s allegation.   Interviewed separately by the caseworker, Father appeared perplexed, denied that any such incident had occurred, and denied that Mother had ever asked him about it.   In addition, the caseworker uncovered a record of a 2007 referral in which A., then 12, had been sexually abused by her 17-year old stepbrother.7  Based on these allegations and the continuing issues with Mother's roommate, DCFS detained the girls and filed a section 300 petition.8

Interviewed for the February 2010 jurisdiction/disposition report, Mother stated that in December 2009, she had separated from Father, moved into a two-bedroom apartment and allowed Porchea to share the space to help with the rent.   However, Porchea failed to pay her share of the rent.   In addition, she smoked marijuana cigarettes in the apartment, leaving the unsmoked portions lying in ashtrays, and invited guests over who also smoked marijuana.   Porchea also allegedly threatened Mother.   A., Evelyn and Elessa stated that they had seen Porchea smoking marijuana-Evelyn believed Porchea was also using cocaine.   None of the girls reported seeing Mother use drugs.9  At the time of the interview, Mother had apparently moved back with Father and no longer had the apartment or the roommate.   Mother acknowledged having a history of mental health problems and claimed to be suffering from depression and anxiety.   She believed she had “a mental problem,” said she was “stressed out,” and claimed she was “not ready for the girls to come home.”   She indicated a desire to eventually be reunited with Evelyn and Elessa, but not with A.

When submitted to the court for adjudication, the petition contained allegations that Mother had “created a detrimental and endangering home environment for the children” under section 300 subdivision (b) by “allow [ing] ․ [Porchea] to reside in the children's home and have unlimited access to the children when [Mother] knew of ․ [Porchea's] current substance abuse.” 10  The petition further alleged that Father had sexually abused A. by fondling her and asking her to engage in oral sex, that the stepbrother had sexually abused A. on four occasions by having intercourse with her, and that Mother knew or reasonably should have known of the sexual abuse and failed to take action.   These allegations were said to justify jurisdiction over A. under section 300, subdivision (d) (sexual abuse) and over Evelyn and Elessa under subdivision (j) (abuse of sibling).

At the February 2010 jurisdictional hearing, the court heard testimony from A. and reviewed the record.   The court concluded that DCFS had not met its burden of proving that Father had sexually propositioned and inappropriately touched A. The court found true that Mother created a dangerous and detrimental home environment under section 300, subdivision (b) by allowing “[Porchea] to reside in the ․ home and to have unlimited access to the children” and by “at times, ․ allowing [Porchea] to be the responsible adult in the home for [the] children for overnight periods” when she “knew of [Porchea's] current substance abuse.”   The court further found with respect to jurisdiction under subdivision (b) that “[a]lthough [Porchea] no longer resides in [Mother's] home, the fact that [Mother] allowed this inappropriate supervision results in a current substantial risk of harm to the children.”

With respect to the allegation of sexual abuse by the stepbrother, the court found:  “On four occasions [A.] was sexually abused by [her stepbrother], who was a member of the child's household at the time.   Such sexual abuse consisted of the [stepbrother] engaging in sexual intercourse with [A.] in [her] home when [she] was 12 years old.   The [stepbrother] was arrested for the six sex crimes against ․ [A.].” The court struck the allegation that Mother knew or reasonably should have known of the sexual abuse.11  In addition, the court did not find that the sexual abuse of A. by her stepbrother justified assertion of jurisdiction over Evelyn and Elessa under section 300, subdivision (j).

The supplemental disposition report stated that Mother had expressed a desire to have Evelyn and Elessa returned to her care.   With respect to A., Mother reiterated her belief that A. should stay with the relative with whom she had been placed.   During a February 2010 monitored visit with A., Mother behaved distantly toward the girl.   It was further reported that Mother repeatedly failed to return telephone calls from A. and on one occasion, declined an opportunity for a visit with the girl.

At the March 2010 disposition hearing, counsel for Mother and Father argued that all three girls should be returned because the individuals who caused the problems-Porchea and the stepbrother-were out of the girls' lives, and because Mother and Father were back together.   The court found by clear and convincing evidence that substantial danger existed to the children, and that there was no reasonable means to protect them without removal from their parents' physical custody.   In issuing its ruling, the court stated that it had considered all of the evidence, including the evidence related to the unsustained allegation, and had concluded that the problem was not merely Mother's roommate, but Mother herself, for “allowing this type of person to be in her home [to] safeguard[ ] ․ and watch[ ] the children.”   As to the argument that because the parents were back together, Father would be responsible for ensuring the safety of the children, the court stated that it had concerns about the stability of the relationship, as Mother and Father had offered no explanation for their separation at the time of the detention or their apparent reunion.12  Mother and Father separately appealed the court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

DISCUSSION

Appellants contend the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's assumption of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) or (d).  They contend the jurisdictional allegations found true by the court did not support that the children were in danger at the time of the hearing because Mother no longer had the apartment or the unsuitable roommate, and the incident involving the stepbrother had occurred several years earlier and had been properly addressed by Mother and Father at the time.   Appellants further contend that the dispositional order removing the children from the custody of their parents was not supported by evidence of substantial danger to the children that could not otherwise be alleviated.   We conclude jurisdiction was supported under subdivision (b) and that the dispositional order is moot.13

A. Jurisdiction

In order to assert jurisdiction over a minor, the juvenile court must find that he or she falls within one or more of the categories specified in section 300.  (In re Veronica G. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 179, 185.)   DCFS bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the minor comes under the juvenile court's jurisdiction.  (Ibid.;  In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329.)   On appeal from a jurisdictional order, “we must uphold the court's findings unless, after reviewing the entire record and resolving all conflicts in favor of the respondent and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment, we determine there is no substantial evidence to support the findings.”  (In re Veronica G., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 185.)

Section 300, subdivision (b) provides that a child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court where “[t]he child has suffered or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child's parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left,․”  The majority of courts-including this one-have concluded that “a court cannot exercise dependency jurisdiction under this subdivision where the evidence shows a lack of current risk.”  (In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1023;  accord, In re Carlos T., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 805;  In re J.O. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 139, 152;  In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1397;  but see In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1434 [holding that subdivisions (a), (b) and (d) “are satisfied by a showing that the minor has suffered prior serious physical harm or abuse”], italics omitted.)

A true finding under subdivision (b) requires proof of:  “(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms;  (2) causation;  and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness' to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.”  (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.)   “The third element ․ effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future.”  (In re Savannah M., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396.)   In determining whether a risk of serious physical harm exists for purposes of subdivision (b), courts may consider “ ‘the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated inflictions of injuries on the minor or the minor's siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the parent or guardian which indicate the child is at risk of serious physical harm.’ ”  (In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 823, quoting § 300, subd. (a);  accord, In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 388.)

Appellants contend that Mother's decision to select Porchea as her roommate and occasional childcare provider was an isolated instance of poor judgment that did not reflect on her abilities as a parent.   We are not persuaded.   The evidence established a repeated pattern of Mother's failing to adequately protect and supervise her children.   First, there was evidence that Mother deposited the girls at Father's home in his absence without contacting him to determine whether he would be available to care for them.   Second, although the court found that DCFS had not met its burden of proving that Father propositioned A. or touched her inappropriately, there was no dispute that A. had reported the allegation to Mother and that Mother did not respond appropriately.   Mother did not report the incident to authorities and when A. did so, Mother attempted to coach her concerning what to say.   Mother claimed to have discussed the girl's accusation with Father, but he unequivocally denied knowing anything about the allegation until the caseworker brought it to his attention.   Mother reported to the caseworker both that she believed and disbelieved A.'s allegation.   Moreover, the caseworker reported that Mother subsequently punished A. for reporting the incident to DCFS by refusing to visit A., failing to return telephone calls from the girl, keeping her at arm's length during at least one visit, and repeatedly informing the caseworker that A. should remain in her out-of-home placement.   Finally, with respect to the roommate, the evidence supported that Mother knew Porchea used drugs regularly and hosted “juvenile delinquents” in the apartment, but nevertheless repeatedly left the children, including two girls under the age of 10, in her care.   Until DCFS became involved, Mother did not attempt to restrict Porchea's behavior or remove her from the apartment.   By her own admission, Mother was suffering from significant mental and emotional distress, including depression and anxiety, and as recently as February 2010, declared herself “not ready for the girls to come home.”   The court could reasonably conclude that Mother's irresponsible behavior in leaving the children in Porchea's care was reflective of a larger problem of poor decision making, contributed to by Mother's own tenuous mental state, and that absent court intervention, the three girls were at risk of serious injury in the future.14

B. Disposition

After finding that a child is a person described in section 300 and therefore the proper subject of dependency jurisdiction, the court must determine “the proper disposition to be made of the child.” (§ 358.)  “A dependent child may not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents ․ with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence ․ [that] [t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor's physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor's parent's ․ physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c).)  There is no requirement of proof of actual harm to the child by the parent;  the standard is substantial risk or danger of harm.  (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1656-1658.)   On review of the court's dispositional findings, “we employ the substantial evidence test, however bearing in mind the heightened burden of proof.”  (Id. at p. 1654.)

Respondent contends the appeal of the court's dispositional order is moot because it challenges custody only, and while this appeal was pending, the court returned the girls to the custody of Mother and Father.15  Generally, “[w]hen no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.”  (In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315-1316.)   However, “a reviewing court may exercise its inherent discretion to resolve an issue rendered moot by subsequent events.”  (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404.)  “We decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether our decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.”  (Ibid.) Father raises no argument in opposition to respondent's mootness contention, and although Mother states in her reply brief that she has “ ‘substantial interests at stake that may be affected by the outcome of this appeal,’ ” her brief identifies none specifically affected by the now superseded dispositional order.  (Quoting In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1055.)   Accordingly, we agree the dispositional order is moot.

Moreover, were we to address the merits, we would find no basis for reversal.   To support its dispositional order removing custody from the parents, “the court may consider the parent's past conduct as well as present circumstances.”  (In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917;  see also In re Y.G. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 109, 116 [juvenile court may “consider a broad class of relevant evidence in deciding whether a child is at substantial risk from a parent's failure or inability to adequately protect or supervise the child.”].) The jurisdictional findings themselves “are prima facie evidence that the child cannot safely remain in the home.”  (In re Cole C., supra, at p. 917.)   In finding jurisdiction appropriate under section 300, subdivision (b), the court of necessity found that the children were at a substantial risk of serious future injury due to Mother's failure to adequately supervise or protect them.   The evidence supported the court's finding for the reasons discussed.   Appellants argued below and contend on appeal that the situation had changed because Father and Mother had reunited and Father was available to protect the children from Mother's unwise choices.   However, because Father worked outside the home, it was clear that Mother would retain primary supervision and control over the girls.   Moreover, as the court noted, it was unclear at the time of the dispositional hearing whether the parents' relationship would be stable.   Appellants gave no reasons for their separation or their hasty reunion, and the court's concern that their relationship could once again fall apart, leaving Mother and the children in a situation similar to their pre-detention circumstances, was warranted by the record before it.

DISPOSITION

The jurisdictional order is affirmed.   The appeal of the dispositional order is dismissed as moot.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

We concur:

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code..  FN1. Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

FN2. At the time proceedings were initiated in January 2010, A. was 15, Evelyn was eight and Elessa was seven.   Those who interviewed A. concluded she was suffering from a cognitive or developmental delay..  FN2. At the time proceedings were initiated in January 2010, A. was 15, Evelyn was eight and Elessa was seven.   Those who interviewed A. concluded she was suffering from a cognitive or developmental delay.

FN3. A.'s father is deceased..  FN3. A.'s father is deceased.

FN4. Father stated that Mother “often” left the girls with him when she left town for “a couple of days.”   On the Wednesday before Thanksgiving, Mother had dropped the children off at his house while he was at work without telling him.   He did not hear from her until the following Friday..  FN4. Father stated that Mother “often” left the girls with him when she left town for “a couple of days.”   On the Wednesday before Thanksgiving, Mother had dropped the children off at his house while he was at work without telling him.   He did not hear from her until the following Friday.

FN5. Porchea's name is sometimes also spelled “Porcha” or “Porsche.”.  FN5. Porchea's name is sometimes also spelled “Porcha” or “Porsche.”

FN6. A. told a caseworker that “a long time ago,” Father touched her “private area” and asked for oral sex.   She told another caseworker that Father asked her if she “want[ed] to do that,” referring to oral sex.   A. told a police investigator that Father had touched her inappropriately and asked for oral sex three to five years earlier.   When she spoke with the police investigator, A. said she did not want Father to go to jail, but subsequently told the investigator Mother had told her to say that.   The other girls were interviewed multiple times and denied any inappropriate touching..  FN6. A. told a caseworker that “a long time ago,” Father touched her “private area” and asked for oral sex.   She told another caseworker that Father asked her if she “want[ed] to do that,” referring to oral sex.   A. told a police investigator that Father had touched her inappropriately and asked for oral sex three to five years earlier.   When she spoke with the police investigator, A. said she did not want Father to go to jail, but subsequently told the investigator Mother had told her to say that.   The other girls were interviewed multiple times and denied any inappropriate touching.

FN7. Interviewed by a police investigator at the time, A. first stated that her stepbrother raped her multiple times between September 8 and 10, 2007, and then stated that the sex, which occurred four times, was consensual.   She also stated that approximately one week earlier, the stepbrother's friend “Nigel” raped her in the bathroom of her home.   When Mother and Father learned of the sexual activity between A. and the stepbrother, they called the police and had him arrested.   Nigel was never identified..  FN7. Interviewed by a police investigator at the time, A. first stated that her stepbrother raped her multiple times between September 8 and 10, 2007, and then stated that the sex, which occurred four times, was consensual.   She also stated that approximately one week earlier, the stepbrother's friend “Nigel” raped her in the bathroom of her home.   When Mother and Father learned of the sexual activity between A. and the stepbrother, they called the police and had him arrested.   Nigel was never identified.

FN8. The girls were initially placed in foster homes, but were soon moved to the homes of relatives..  FN8. The girls were initially placed in foster homes, but were soon moved to the homes of relatives.

FN9. Mother admitted smoking marijuana in the past to relieve stress and to combat depression caused by the loss of her mother, but said she did so outside the presence of the children..  FN9. Mother admitted smoking marijuana in the past to relieve stress and to combat depression caused by the loss of her mother, but said she did so outside the presence of the children.

FN10. Other allegations under subdivision (b) were dismissed prior to adjudication.   One of the allegations-that Mother had a history of substance abuse and was a current user of marijuana-was dismissed on condition that Mother submit to drug testing..  FN10. Other allegations under subdivision (b) were dismissed prior to adjudication.   One of the allegations-that Mother had a history of substance abuse and was a current user of marijuana-was dismissed on condition that Mother submit to drug testing.

FN11. Counsel for DCFS had earlier conceded that there was no evidence to establish this allegation..  FN11. Counsel for DCFS had earlier conceded that there was no evidence to establish this allegation.

FN12. The court ordered that DCFS provide the following reunification services:  to Mother, parent education and individual counseling to address depression, anxiety, sexual abuse awareness and other case issues;  to Father, parent education and individual counseling to address case issues, including sexual abuse awareness..  FN12. The court ordered that DCFS provide the following reunification services:  to Mother, parent education and individual counseling to address depression, anxiety, sexual abuse awareness and other case issues;  to Father, parent education and individual counseling to address case issues, including sexual abuse awareness.

FN13. With respect to subdivision (d), this court recently concluded that evidence that a child “ ‘has been sexually abused’ ” in the past is sufficient to support jurisdiction under that subdivision.  (In re Carlos T. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 795, 804.)   There, the father had engaged in repeated acts of sexual abuse against one child of which the mother was aware, and the court found the mother knew or reasonably should have known that her other child was at risk.   In the instant case, it is undisputed that A. was the victim of sexual abuse by her stepbrother, but there is no evidence that either parent was on notice of the likelihood of such abuse, and it is undisputed that both parents behaved appropriately when they learned of the abuse, contacting authorities and having the stepbrother arrested.   We need not decide whether past sexual abuse by a household member, standing alone, could support a jurisdictional finding as to the abused minor where, as here, the abuse occurred years earlier, was of limited duration, and was committed by a person no longer in the minor's life, and where the record discloses no evidence that the parents were aware of the potential for abuse or failed to take appropriate action when apprised of it.  (See In re James B. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 524, 530 [parent not unfit where, upon learning older brother had molested younger daughter, mother “t[ook] appropriate corrective measures to [e]nsure that the abusive conduct would not happen again,” and “[t]here was no evidence of any further threat of molestation.”].) As noted, we find jurisdiction as to all three children supported under subdivision (b)..  FN13. With respect to subdivision (d), this court recently concluded that evidence that a child “ ‘has been sexually abused’ ” in the past is sufficient to support jurisdiction under that subdivision.  (In re Carlos T. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 795, 804.)   There, the father had engaged in repeated acts of sexual abuse against one child of which the mother was aware, and the court found the mother knew or reasonably should have known that her other child was at risk.   In the instant case, it is undisputed that A. was the victim of sexual abuse by her stepbrother, but there is no evidence that either parent was on notice of the likelihood of such abuse, and it is undisputed that both parents behaved appropriately when they learned of the abuse, contacting authorities and having the stepbrother arrested.   We need not decide whether past sexual abuse by a household member, standing alone, could support a jurisdictional finding as to the abused minor where, as here, the abuse occurred years earlier, was of limited duration, and was committed by a person no longer in the minor's life, and where the record discloses no evidence that the parents were aware of the potential for abuse or failed to take appropriate action when apprised of it.  (See In re James B. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 524, 530 [parent not unfit where, upon learning older brother had molested younger daughter, mother “t[ook] appropriate corrective measures to [e]nsure that the abusive conduct would not happen again,” and “[t]here was no evidence of any further threat of molestation.”].) As noted, we find jurisdiction as to all three children supported under subdivision (b).

FN14. A child “is a dependent if the actions of either parent bring her within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent.”  (In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397.)   Thus, the fact that Father is non-offending, does not impact the jurisdictional finding.   By the same token, a finding of jurisdiction over a child affects both parents and either may attack the finding on appeal.   Respondent's contention that Father lacks standing to dispute allegations relating solely to Mother is without merit.  (See In re Desiree M. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 329, 333, quoting In re Patricia E. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 1, 6 [“A parent has standing to raise issues affecting her interest in the parent-child relationship.   [Citation.]  ‘Where the interests of two parties interweave, either party has standing to litigate issues that have a[n] impact upon the related interests.’ ”].).  FN14. A child “is a dependent if the actions of either parent bring her within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent.”  (In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397.)   Thus, the fact that Father is non-offending, does not impact the jurisdictional finding.   By the same token, a finding of jurisdiction over a child affects both parents and either may attack the finding on appeal.   Respondent's contention that Father lacks standing to dispute allegations relating solely to Mother is without merit.  (See In re Desiree M. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 329, 333, quoting In re Patricia E. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 1, 6 [“A parent has standing to raise issues affecting her interest in the parent-child relationship.   [Citation.]  ‘Where the interests of two parties interweave, either party has standing to litigate issues that have a[n] impact upon the related interests.’ ”].)

FN15. We granted respondent's request to take judicial notice of the juvenile court's July 19, 2010 order placing the girls in the home of their parents under the supervision of DCFS..  FN15. We granted respondent's request to take judicial notice of the juvenile court's July 19, 2010 order placing the girls in the home of their parents under the supervision of DCFS.

EPSTEIN, P. J. SUZUKAWA, J.