THE PEOPLE v. ISAIAH JERMAINE SAMPSON

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Court of Appeal, Second District, California.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ISAIAH JERMAINE SAMPSON, Defendant and Appellant.

B227012

Decided: February 23, 2011

John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

After Sampson threatened to kill Floyd Edward Wright and a police officer, he was charged on March 4, 2010 by criminal complaint, with two counts of making a criminal threat (§ 422) in case No. NA084863.   The complaint specially alleged Sampson had previously served a separate prison term for a felony (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and was subject to sentencing under the Three Strikes law.   Sampson pleaded not guilty to the counts and denied the special allegations.

Represented by appointed counsel, Sampson decided to enter an open plea to the trial court on July 12, 2010.   At the time he entered his plea, Sampson was advised of his constitutional rights and the nature and consequences of plea and admissions, which Sampson stated he understood.   The trial court expressly told Sampson that his sentence would amount to three years, but Sampson would actually serve about 18 months.

Thereafter, Sampson pleaded no contest to both counts in case No. NA084576 and to both counts in case No. NA084863 and he admitted all of the prior conviction allegations.   Defense counsel joined in the waivers of Sampson's constitutional rights.   The police reports formed the factual basis for the pleas.   The trial court expressly found Sampson's waivers, plea and admissions were voluntary, knowing and intelligent.   Prior to sentencing, the court dismissed the prior conviction allegations in each case.   In case No. NA084576 the court imposed concurrent three-year terms for failing to register (count 1), and for failing to file a change of address (count 2).   In case No. NA084863, the court imposed concurrent three-year terms for making a criminal threat (counts 1 & 2) to be served concurrently to the sentence imposed in case No. NA084576.   The court awarded Sampson presentence custody credit of 245 days (123 actual days and 122 days of conduct credit) in each case.   The court ordered Sampson to pay a $30 court security assessment, a $30 criminal conviction assessment and a $200 restitution fine, and imposed and stayed a parole revocation fine pursuant to section 1202.45 in each case.

The day after he was sentenced, Sampson made an oral motion to withdraw his pleas.   Sampson argued he was “bipolar” and was not sufficiently medicated at the plea hearing.   As a result, Sampson believed he was “getting 18 months at half-time” as opposed to “36 months at half-time.”   The court denied his motion.   Sampson filed timely notices of appeal.   The trial court denied his request for certificates of probable cause.

We appointed counsel to represent Sampson on appeal.

After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised.   On November 29, 2010, we advised defendant he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider.   On December 6, 2010, we received a two-page handwritten supplemental brief.

In his notice of appeal, Sampson purported to appeal from “the judgment rendered on July 13, 2010.”   However, judgment was orally pronounced on July 12, 2010, the date Sampson entered his plea and was sentenced.   On July 13, 2010, the trial court denied Sampson's oral motion to withdraw his pleas.   Accordingly, we construe Sampson's notice of appeal as from the postjudgment order denying Sampson's motion to withdraw his pleas.

In his notice of appeal and supplemental brief, Sampson contends that at the time of his pleas, he had not received his bipolar medication and therefore mistakenly believed he was agreeing to an 18-month incarceration in county jail, rather than a state prison commitment.   Sampson also argued he should have been offered a county jail sentence, having “paid his debt to society.”   In his supplemental brief, Sampson further argued that the police lied and treated him unfairly, his counsel was constitutionally ineffective, and he was “made to look bad” because he was a sex offender.4

We have examined the entire record and are satisfied defendant's attorney has fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel, and no arguable issues exist.  (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756];  People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118-119;  People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)   The record fails to support Sampson's claims that his pleas were not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, or that he did not understand the nature and consequences of his pleas and combined sentence.   The record also fails to demonstrate defense counsel provided ineffective assistance at any time during the proceedings in the trial court.   (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674].)

The order is affirmed.

We concur:

FOOTNOTES

FN1. All case numbers refer to Los Angeles County Superior Court cases..  FN1. All case numbers refer to Los Angeles County Superior Court cases.

FN2. Statutory references are to the Penal Code..  FN2. Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

FN3. In 2002, Sampson was convicted of “simple rape” in the state of Louisiana..  FN3. In 2002, Sampson was convicted of “simple rape” in the state of Louisiana.

FN4. On January 18, 2011, Sampson filed a request to dismiss his pending appeal in this court, which was forwarded to his appellate counsel.   However, there has been no communication from counsel of Sampson's wish to have his appeal dismissed..  FN4. On January 18, 2011, Sampson filed a request to dismiss his pending appeal in this court, which was forwarded to his appellate counsel.   However, there has been no communication from counsel of Sampson's wish to have his appeal dismissed.

PERLUSS, P.J. JACKSON, J.