WILLIAMS v. The People, Real Party in Interest.

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Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Charles Andrew WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.

No. D038141.

Decided: November 28, 2001

Steven J. Carroll, Public Defender, Gary R. Nichols, Jo Pastore, Robert Rexrode, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner. John T. Philipsborn, San Francisco, for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, upon the request of the Court of Appeal, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. No appearance by Respondent. Paul J. Pfingst, District Attorney, Thomas F. McArdle and Anthony Lovett, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Laura Whitcomb Halgren and Patti W. Ranger, Deputy Attorneys General, upon the request of the Court of Appeal, as Amicus Curiae. Gary T. Yancey, District Attorney (Contra Costa) and L. Douglas Pipes, Deputy District Attorney for the California District Attorneys Association, upon the request of the Court of Appeal, as Amicus Curiae.

This petition challenges the constitutionality of Welfare and Institutions Code (W & I) section 602, subdivision (b)(1), enacted by section 18 of Proposition 21, the “Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention” initiative (hereafter Proposition 21).1  Under W & I section 602, subdivision (b)(1), a minor age 14 or older who is alleged to have committed enumerated offenses must be prosecuted in adult rather than juvenile court.

Petitioner Charles Andrew Williams (petitioner) was charged in adult court pursuant to W & I section 602, subdivision (b)(1).   He argues that Proposition 21 is invalid because it violates the single-subject rule contained in the California Constitution, article II, section 8, subdivision (d), that W & I section 602, subdivision (b)(1) is therefore invalid, and that the adult court does not have jurisdiction over this proceeding.

We recognize the issue presented by this petition is currently pending before the California Supreme Court.   We also recognize that Court will write the final decision on the validity of Proposition 21.   Our duty in the interim is to resolve the issue in the case before us to the best of our ability based upon the available precedent.   Based upon our analysis of existing law, we will reject the challenge based upon the single-subject rule finding that although Proposition 21 is a complex criminal justice reform measure with multiple subparts, each part is reasonably germane to the general purposes of the initiative.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The San Diego County District Attorney filed a complaint in respondent court charging petitioner with two counts of murder (Pen.Code,2 § 187, subd. (a)), and alleged as to each murder the special circumstances of multiple murders and lying in wait.3 (§ 190.2, subds.(a)(3), (15).)  The complaint also alleged in connection with the murder counts that petitioner was a minor age 14 years or older at the time of the murders and had personally killed the victims, and the murders involved special circumstances within the meaning of W & I section 602, subdivision (b).

Petitioner demurred to the complaint, contending the court had jurisdiction over these proceedings solely by virtue of Proposition 21, and that Proposition 21 was invalid because it violated the single-subject rule.4  The court overruled the demurrer.   Petitioner then filed the writ petition now before us.   We ordered a stay of the proceedings below, and issued an order to show cause and heard oral argument.   He reasserts in his writ petition that Proposition 21, including W & I section 602, subdivision (b), is invalid because it violates the single-subject rule.

II

ANALYSIS

 The initiative process is a power reserved to the people rather than one granted to them (National Paint & Coatings Assn. v. State of California (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 753, 760, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 360), and occupies a “cherished and favored role ․ in our constitutional scheme.”  (Senate of State of Cal. v. Jones (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1142, 1158, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 988 P.2d 1089 (Jones ).)  However, the initiative power is subject to an important limitation under article II, section 8, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, which provides that initiative measures may not “embrac[e] more than one subject.”

Petitioner contends Proposition 21 violates the single-subject rule because it embraces numerous subjects that are not reasonably germane to each other or to the stated purpose of the initiative.   The People counter that under case law an initiative may have a broad scope without violating article II, section 8, subdivision (d), and argue Proposition 21 does not offend the single-subject rule because its provisions are reasonably germane to each other and to its stated purpose.

A. The Standards for Evaluating a Single-Subject Challenge

 The courts have recognized the single-subject rule is consistent with the “cherished and favored role” occupied by the initiative process because the single-subject rule is an integral safeguard designed to maintain the integrity of the initiative process by preventing deceptive manipulation or abuse of that process.  (Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1157 1158, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 988 P.2d 1089.)   The single-subject rule promotes related policies:  to protect the electorate from confusing or misleading measures (ibid.), and to prevent proponents of initiatives from engaging in “logrolling.” 5  (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 231-232, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281 (Amador Valley ).)

 The oft stated test is that an initiative, even though containing numerous and complex provisions, comports with California's single-subject rule if “ ‘despite its varied collateral effects, all of its parts are “reasonably germane” to each other,’ and to the general purpose or object of the initiative.”  (Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 245, 186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274 (Brosnahan ), emphasis in original.)   The single-subject rule “obviously forbids joining disparate provisions which appear germane only to topics of excessive generality such as ‘government’ or ‘public welfare,’ ” but the courts have indulged in a “liberal interpretative tradition ․ of sustaining statutes and initiatives which fairly disclose a reasonable and common sense relationship among their various components in furtherance of a common purpose.”  (Id. at p. 253, 186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274.)   The single-subject rule does not require that each of the provisions of an initiative measure effectively interlock in a functional relationship (id. at pp. 248-249, 186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274);  however, the various provisions must be reasonably related to a common theme or purpose.  (Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 347-348, 276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077.)   If the provisions of an initiative possess a reasonable and common sense relationship among its various components to further the common underlying purpose, then “[w]hether or not these various provisions are wise or sensible, and will combine effectively to achieve their stated purpose, is not our concern in evaluating [a] single-subject challenge.”   (Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 514, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309, emphasis in original.)

 The diversity of an initiative's purposes and subjects, rather than the number of its provisions, invalidates an initiative under the single-subject rule.   For example, in Brosnahan the California Supreme Court considered a challenge to Proposition 8, the “Victims' Bill of Rights,” an initiative with wide ranging and numerous provisions including victim restitution, school safety, bail, sentence enhancements, the use of prior convictions to impeach, the defense of diminished capacity, and evidentiary rule changes.   The Brosnahan court held it did not violate the single-subject rule because the parts, although numerous, were reasonably germane to a central defined purpose.6  (Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 246, 186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274.)

In contrast, in Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1142, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 988 P.2d 1089, the California Supreme Court evaluated a proposed initiative that contained relatively few substantive provisions but held it invalid because its provisions addressed two distinct subjects.   Several provisions were concerned with compensation of state officers, and a separate provision addressed the distinct subject of reapportionment of voting districts.  (Id. at p. 1161, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 988 P.2d 1089.)   The court concluded these provisions did not have a common subject beyond a commonality at a level of abstraction so general it would “ ‘essentially obliterat[e] the constitutional requirement’ ” of a single subject.  (Id. at p. 1162, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 988 P.2d 1089.)   Additionally, the Jones court's analysis described how joinder of the disparate subjects within the proposed initiative threatened to undermine the policies promoted by the single-subject rule, thus confirming that one component of a single-subject analysis is whether the joined provisions might confuse or deceive voters or permit logrolling.  (See Uelmen, Handling Hot Potatoes:  Judicial Review of California Initiatives After Senate v. Jones (2001) 41 Santa Clara L.Rev. 999, 1024-1025.)

B. The Matters Encompassed Within Proposition 21

 Proposition 21's title, as well as its findings and declarations, state that its purpose is to reduce juvenile and gang-related crime.  (Prop.21, §§ 1-2.)   Because one indicia of compliance with the single-subject rule is the extent to which the substantive provisions of an initiative are consonant with the purposes expressed in the initiative's title and preamble (California Trial Lawyers Assn. v. Eu (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 351, 358, 245 Cal.Rptr. 916;  Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 246-247, 186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274), we detail the substantive provisions of Proposition 21 and examine those provisions for consonance with its stated purpose.

The 32 substantive sections of Proposition 21 can be subdivided into four subsets.   The first subset, which we denominate the “gang provisions,” are those sections that amend or enact statutes specifically targeted at the problems presented by street gangs.   Sections 3 through 10 of Proposition 21 amend portions of the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (§ 186.21 et seq., the STEP Act), an act designed to combat violent street gangs. (§ 186.21.) Section 11 of Proposition 21 adds gang-related murder as a special circumstance.   Portions of section 15 of Proposition 21 add two gang-related crimes to the provisions of section 667.5, and a portion of section 13 of Proposition 21 amends the wiretap statute (§ 629.52) to add violation of the STEP Act to the crimes for which wiretaps may be authorized.

The second subset, which we denominate the “juvenile provisions,” is composed of sections that address juvenile crime and the juvenile justice system and apply to all juvenile offenders regardless of whether the offender is a participant in a street gang.7 Sections 18 through 34 of Proposition 21 amend various portions of the W & I to alter various aspects of the juvenile justice system, including:  expanding the list of offenders who must (Prop.21, § 18), or in the prosecutor's discretion may (Prop.21, § 26), be prosecuted in adult court;  changing the procedures and standards for revoking a juvenile's probation (Prop.21, § 27);  reducing in various ways the confidentiality previously afforded to juvenile offenders (Prop. 21, §§ 19, 25 & 30);  and making other changes pertaining to juvenile offenders.

The third subset, which we denominate the “repeat offender provisions,” is composed of four sections that apply to all offenders regardless of their age or gang affiliation.   Sections 15 and 17 of Proposition 21 amend sections 667.5 and 1192.7, respectively, to expand the list of violent and serious felonies that qualify for treatment under those sections and under the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds.(b)-(i)).   Sections 14 and 16 of Proposition 21 change the reference dates for sections 667.5 and 1192.7, respectively, from June 30, 1993, to March 8, 2000, which has the effect of expanding the lists of violent and serious felonies that qualify all offenders for treatment under the Three Strikes law.

The fourth subset, which we denominate the “wiretap provisions” is composed of a portion of section 13 of Proposition 21 that amends the wiretap statute (§ 629.52) to add a violation of section 186.22 and a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 (possession of funds in excess of $100,000 related to illegal drugs) to the crimes for which a wiretap may be authorized.

C. Proposition 21 and the Single-Subject Rule

 Our review of the substantive provisions of Proposition 21 convinces us that all of its components are reasonably germane to other of its components or to its stated purpose.   Therefore, we conclude that Proposition 21 is not subject to challenge under article II, section 8, subdivision (d), of the California Constitution.

 As a preliminary matter, we agree with the People that Proposition 21's amalgamation of juvenile provisions with gang provisions does not offend the single-subject rule.   The declared purpose and goal of Proposition 21 was to address the broad problem of juvenile crime, and to target gang violence as a specific and more dangerous subset of the broader problem.  (Prop.21, § 2.) Although petitioner correctly asserts that not all juvenile offenders belong to gangs, and all gang members are not juveniles, there is an undeniable and significant overlap between these two groups.8  Accordingly, we are satisfied the portions of Proposition 21 enacting a comprehensive, two-pronged approach-one seeking to reform a juvenile justice system that deals with nearly all juvenile offenders who are a significant percentage of the gang offenders, and a second prong targeting gang offenders-encompass provisions reasonably germane to the single-subject of crimes by youths acting individually or in concert with their gangs.   The commonality of juvenile crime and gangs is not at a level of abstraction so general it obliterates the constitutional requirement of a single subject.  (Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1162, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 988 P.2d 1089.)

The principal challenge in the petition focuses on the recidivist provisions of sections 15 through 17 of the measure.   We will discuss the several challenges to those provisions separately.

D. Recidivist Provisions

Section 15 of Proposition 21 is a repeat offender provision that expands the list of violent felonies that qualify for enhanced punishment of habitual criminals under section 667.5 (Prop.21, § 15).

Sections 16 and 17 of Proposition 21 are also repeat offender provisions that expand the list of serious felonies that will qualify as strikes under the Three Strikes law.   Proposition 21 accomplishes this by first explicitly adding offenses to the list of serious felonies contained in section 1192.7, subdivision (c) and then enacting section 1170.125.  (Prop.21, §§ 16, 17.)   Proposition 21 then adds section 1170.125, which modifies the Three Strikes law to include as qualifying felonies all post-June 30, 1993, additions to the serious felonies list.9  The post-June 30, 1993, legislative additions to the serious felonies thus converted into qualifying serious felonies by sections 1170.125 and 667.1 encompass a number of offenses added by the Legislature in 1998, including:  (1) throwing acid or flammable substances in violation of section 244;  (2) continuous sexual abuse of a child in violation of section 288.5;  (3) rape in concert in violation of section 264.1;  and (4) any violation of section 12022.53.  (See Stats.1998, ch. 936, § 13.5.) It also converts carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)), an offense added by the Legislature to section 1192.7, subdivision (c) in October 1993 (see People v. Nava (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1732, 1736-1737, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 543), into a qualifying serious felony.

Petitioner contends these provisions violate the single-subject rule in that they principally revise the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds.(b)-(i)) and are not reasonably germane to the purposes of the initiative which deals with juvenile and gang-related crime.   Petitioner argues the addition of such nonjuvenile related matters would mislead the voters and introduce unrelated changes to the recidivist statutes which are primarily directed to adult crimes.

 We believe careful analysis of the recidivist provisions of Proposition 21 demonstrate the changes in those statutes are reasonably germane to addressing juvenile and street gang crime.   The modification of the “freeze date” for the definition of serious/violent felonies under the Three Strikes law is a necessary step to accomplish the purposes of Proposition 21.   The resulting inclusion of serious felonies defined by the Legislature since 1993 but before the enactment of Proposition 21 is a reasonable collateral consequence of the initiative as recognized as appropriate in Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1142, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 988 P.2d 1089.

Proposition 21 added nine new felonies to the serious felony list. These felonies are:  (1) exploding a destructive device with bodily injury (§ 12309), (2) any felony which would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22, (3) all violations of section 245, (4) all violations of sections 245.2, 245.3 and 245.5, (5) discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling, vehicle or aircraft (§ 246), (6) shooting a firearm from a vehicle (§ 12034, subds.(c) & (d)), (7) intimidating victims and witnesses (§ 136.1), (8) criminal threats (§ 422);  and (9) conspiracy to commit any serious felony (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)).

In addition, Proposition 21 added nine new felonies to the violent felony list.   These nine new violent felonies are (1) all robberies (§ 211), (2) arson of an inhabited structure or inhabited property (§ 451, subd. (b)), (3) exploding destructive device with bodily injury and great bodily injury (§§ 12309 & 12310), (4) all kidnappings, (5) all violations of section 220, (6) all carjackings, (7) extortion for gang purposes (§§ 518 & 186.22), (8) threatening witnesses and victims for gang purposes (§§ 136.1 & 186.22), and (9) any first degree burglary in which a nonaccomplice of the defendant was present in the residence at the time of the burglary.

Petitioner claims these felonies have nothing to do with gang or juvenile activities and argues they relate solely to adult offenders. We disagree.   It is apparent that the nine new serious felonies will clearly impact juveniles.   Five of the nine serious felonies, section 186.22, section 245, subdivision (a), (assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury), section 246, section 136.1 and section 12034, subdivision (c), were already listed in subdivision (b) of W & I section 707 prior to the enactment of Proposition 21.   However, before this Proposition the five felonies listed above could not constitute serious or violent felonies within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), based upon a juvenile adjudication because they were not serious felonies when committed by an adult.  (People v. Leng (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 433.)   Including these five new felonies in both lists, that is, the W & I section 707, subdivision (b) list, and Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c), makes juvenile adjudications of these five felonies strikes within the meaning of the Three Strikes law.

Any crime that is contained in the list of serious or violent felonies can constitute a strike when the crime is committed by a 16 or 17-year-old juvenile, and the crime results in an adjudication of wardship in the juvenile court for the offense listed in W & I section 707, subdivision (b).  The addition of the five new felonies to the list of serious felonies which were not previously contained in section 1192.7, subdivision (c), makes it possible for a juvenile to accumulate a strike as a result of a juvenile adjudication of the newly added serious felonies.

The remaining new serious felonies, sections 182, 245.2, 245.3 and 245.5, as well as sections 422 and 12309, were not listed in W & I section 707, subdivision (b) prior to the enactment of Proposition 21 nor were they added by that initiative.   Under previous law juvenile adjudications for those four felonies could never be strikes because they were not serious felonies when committed by an adult.  (People v. Leng, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 10-11, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 433.)   Since these four felonies have been included in the serious felony list and because the freeze date for strikes has been changed, a juvenile adjudication for these four felonies could constitute a strike if the qualifying juvenile is adjudged a ward of the juvenile court in the same proceeding for at least one offense listed in W & I section 707, subdivision (b).  (People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 6, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 980 P.2d 829.)

Thus it seems clear that the addition of the nine new felonies listed above to the list of serious felonies under section 1192.7, subdivision (c), does not relate solely to adult nongang offenders as petitioner contends.   Nor does it “relate[ ] only to sentencing enhancements for adult criminal offenders.”

 Similarly the addition of nine felonies to the violent felony list of section 667.5, subdivision (c) does not relate simply to the prosecution of adults.   When a crime is added to the list of violent felonies if that crime is not also a serious felony its addition to section 667.5, subdivision (c) makes it a strike.   Further, denominating a crime a violent felony limits conduct credits, including work time and good time credits which a prisoner can earn to only 15 percent of the sentence.  (People v. Palacios (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 252, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 318;  § 2933.1.) Finally, an enhancement may be added to the subordinate term for a violent felony.  (People v. Ramos ) (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 810, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 24;  (People v. Palacios, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 252, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 318.)

While limitation upon conduct credits and the enhancement for violent subordinate terms do not apply to juvenile court proceedings, they would apply to juveniles who are prosecuted as adults in the criminal courts.   Both Proposition 21 and the law in existence at the time of its passage recognize some juveniles can lawfully be prosecuted in the criminal courts.

One of the principal defects in petitioner's challenge to the recidivist provisions of Proposition 21 is the assumption its purpose is to address offenses under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.   The initiative is not so limited.   The measure certainly deals with such prosecutions, however, it also purports to significantly expand the circumstances under which juveniles can be prosecuted in adult court.   Thus increasing the availability of recidivist treatment for certain types of criminal conduct potentially effects juveniles who are prosecuted in adult court or those who have suffered prior juvenile adjudications which can be alleged as strikes when such juveniles reoffend and are sent to the criminal courts.

Petitioner also makes the erroneous assumption that Proposition 21 effects only juveniles.   It does not.   The reach of initiative's stated purposes is to address crime by street gangs as well as juveniles.   While it is true street gangs include juveniles such persons are not the exclusive membership of those gangs.   As we have previously noted a 1998 National Youth Gang Survey conducted by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention indicated only 40 percent of gang members were 17 years of age or under.   Thus, the statutory amendments to add recidivist provisions relevant to such gang activity will, of necessity, include adult offenders within its scope.

E. Changing the “Freeze Date”

Sections 14 and 16 of Proposition 21 update the freeze date of the Three Strikes law.   The proposition enacted sections 667.1 and 1170.125 which provide that all references to existing statutes in “three strikes” “are to those statutes as they existed on the effective date of this act including amendments made to those statutes by this act.”   Since a felony strike is any conviction or juvenile adjudication of violent or serious felonies listed or defined in sections 667.5, subdivision (c) and 1192.7, subdivision (c), the effect of these newly enacted sections is to update the strike list to mirror the serious and violent felony lists as those lists read on March 8, 2000 as amended by Proposition 21.

The enactment of sections 667.1 and 1170.125 was appropriate in order to qualify as strikes the nine new felonies that the proposition added to the list of serious felonies under section 1192.7, subdivision (c).  Without the enactment of these sections the nine new serious felonies would not qualify as strikes.   We are persuaded that sections 667.1 and 1170.125 are reasonably related to the basic purpose of Proposition 21 which is to increase the protection of California's citizens against violent crime committed by juveniles and street gangs.   Expansion of the crimes which can serve as strikes will increase the likelihood of greater sentences for juveniles and gang members who commit or have committed in the past violent crimes.

 Petitioner argues the section modifying the “freeze date” is misleading to the voter because it relates solely to adult nongang offenders.   Petitioner contends the crimes added to the strike list which include assault with intent to commit rape, throwing acid, and continuous sexual abuse of a child are not gang related.   The principal weakness of this argument however is that those crimes were declared serious felonies by the Legislature (as well as the crimes of carjacking, assault with a deadly weapon on a firefighter, and violation of section 12022.53) prior to the enactment of this initiative.   The fact these legislatively declared serious felonies were swept into the Three Strikes law by the enactment of Proposition 21 is a collateral consequence of the measure.   Alteration of the freeze date was essential to accomplish the purpose of the initiative.   That it had a collateral effect outside the purpose of the initiative is not fatal to its validity.  (Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1157, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 988 P.2d 1089;  Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 512, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309;  Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 245, 186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274.)

In sum, we are satisfied that the recidivist provisions of Proposition 21 are reasonably germane to its purposes and that such relationship is not destroyed by the collateral effects of the amendment to the freeze date of the Three Strikes law.   We reject the challenge on those grounds.

F. Wiretap Provisions

Section 13 of Proposition 21 amended section 629.52 to add section 186.22 to the list of felony offenses for which wiretapping may be authorized.   Petitioner does not contend that section 186.22 is unrelated to juvenile and street gang activity.   There is no serious challenge in this petition to this particular amendment to section 629.52.

 During our review of section 13 of the initiative we noted it also added Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 10 to the list of offenses for which wiretapping can be authorized.   The parties had not addressed that particular portion of section 13 of the initiative.   We requested supplemental briefing from the parties in order to address the question of whether the addition of a drug money laundering offense to the wiretap statute was reasonably germane to the purposes of Proposition 21.

Petitioner filed a terse response simply asserting that the addition of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 to the wiretap statute was not reasonably germane to the purposes of Proposition 21. Petitioner offered no analysis to support such assertion.

The real party in interest (People) and their amicus California District Attorneys Association (CDAA) filed substantial supplemental briefs persuasively arguing that drug money laundering is an activity relevant to street gangs.   Thus they contend the addition of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 to the wiretap statute is reasonably germane to the purpose of addressing juvenile violence and street gang activity.   We agree with real party in interest and amicus CDAA.

First, it is virtually without dispute in this record that juveniles are significantly involved in street gang activity (see 1998 National Youth Gang Survey published by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of the U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra;  see also § 13826, subds. (a) & (b)).11  Street gangs in turn are clearly involved in drug dealing in order to provide income.  (1997 National Youth Gang Survey, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Summary and Conclusions () [as of Nov. 28, 2001];  § 13826, subd. (f).)

The Legislature has clearly recognized the need to address drug activities by street gangs including money laundering.   It included money laundering within the street gang statute. (§ 186.10;  see also People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 797, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 150.)

Given the undisputed facts that juveniles represent a significant portion of street gangs and that those gangs regularly engage in drug transactions which also include the legislatively recognized possibility of money laundering, the addition of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 to the list of felonies in the wiretap statute was reasonably germane to the purposes of Proposition 21.

G. Conclusion

As we noted at the outset, Proposition 21 is a complex criminal justice reform related to juvenile crime and the activities of street gangs which include heavy representation by juveniles.   Although the initiative is complex and includes multiple subparts we find that it is indistinguishable from the propositions encompassing broad criminal justice reforms approved by the Supreme Court in Raven, supra, 52 Cal.3d 336, 276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077 and Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d 236, 186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274.   We believe this initiative is plainly distinguishable from the circumstance presented to the Supreme Court in Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1142, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 988 P.2d 1089 and therefore find it does not violate the single-subject rule.

DISPOSITION

The petition for writ of prohibition is denied.

I agree with the majority's cogent synopsis of the principles guiding our evaluation of whether Proposition 21 offends the single-subject rule.   I also agree that some provisions of Proposition 21 are reasonably germane to other provisions and to its stated general purpose.   However, the single-subjecttttt rule requires that all of an initiative's provisions be reasonably germane to each other and to its stated purpose.   The bulk of the repeat offender provisions and one aspect of the wiretapping provisions in Proposition 21 facially and primarily target all offenders and are not limited to juveniles or gang members.   In my view, the fact that these provisions can on occasion be applied to some juveniles or gang members is so incidental or collateral to their primary focus and impact that their inclusion in Proposition 21 violates the single-subject rule;  they are reasonably germane neither to other provisions of Proposition 21 nor to its stated purpose.

To distill why I cannot subscribe to the majority's conclusion, I begin with those aspects of the majority opinion with which I agree.   I view the 32 substantive sections of Proposition 21 as divisible into three broad subsets.1  The first subset, the gang provisions, consists of sections of Proposition 21 that amend or enact statutes specifically targeting the problems presented by street gangs.2  The second subset, the juvenile provisions, consists of sections of Proposition 21 that amend or enact statutes addressing juvenile crime and the juvenile justice system.   The juvenile provisions apply to all juvenile offenders regardless of whether the juvenile is also a participant in a street gang.3  Were Proposition 21 limited to these two sets of provisions, I agree it would not offend the single-subject rule.   The majority has noted the overlap between juveniles and gang members.   An initiative that enacts a comprehensive program both to reform the juvenile justice system and to target a more pernicious subset of juvenile offenders (e.g. gang offenders) encompasses provisions reasonably germane to the single subject of crimes by youths acting individually or in concert with their gangs.   Moreover, were Proposition 21 limited to juvenile and gang provisions, the risks of voter confusion and deception would have been minimized.   Those provisions are consonant with its title, the purposes set forth in its findings and declarations (California Trial Lawyers Assn. v. Eu (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 351, 358, 245 Cal.Rptr. 916;  Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 246 247, 186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274), and the arguments of its proponents contained in the ballot materials.

The third subset, the repeat offenders provision and the wiretap provision targeting non-gang offenders, consists of sections of Proposition 21 that amend or enact statutes addressing enhanced punishment, recidivism and permissible wiretapping not directly related to juvenile or gang crime.   In my view, the inclusion of the third subset of provisions offends the single-subject rule.   The bulk of the repeat offender provisions and the wiretap provision target all offenders regardless of their ages or gang affiliations, and any relationship between the repeat offender provisions or the wiretap provision and Proposition 21's other provisions and its stated purpose is largely fortuitous.

 Repeat Offender Provisions

Proposition 21 expands the list of violent felonies that qualify for enhanced punishments available under Penal Code section 667.5.4  (Prop.21, § 15.)   The newly added violent felonies include (1) any robbery (§ 211);  (2) any arson of an inhabited structure or property (§ 451, subd. (b));  (3) exploding destructive devices causing any bodily injury (§ 12309);  (4) any kidnapping (§ 207);  (5) assault in violation of section 220;  (6) any carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a));  (7) any first degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (a)) if a non-accomplice was present in the residence at the time of the burglary;  and (8) any violation of section 12022.53.5  I recognize, and the majority sub silencio concedes, that the only impact of adding these nine offenses to the violent felony list is to more harshly punish adults or juveniles prosecuted as adults who commit those offenses;  the only consequences that Proposition 21 imposes on a person who commits one of these newly listed offenses are a limitation on conduct credits available to, and an added enhancement to prison term imposed on, persons prosecuted and punished in adult court.6  Thus, these nine additions to the violent felonies list do not target problems created by juvenile offenders generally or gang members specifically.   Instead, these nine provisions identify specified offenses rather than specified offenders and increase the punishment for all adults who commit the specified offenses.

Although the majority opinion correctly points out that gang members and juveniles who are prosecuted as adults are also subject to the changes to the violent felonies list, it is by fortuity rather than design that these provisions might impact the problems targeted by, or have any relationship to, the other juvenile and gang provisions contained in Proposition 21.   If an initiative's articulated purpose is to target one problem (juvenile and gang crime) and many of its provisions are tailored toward that purpose, but a separate group of its provisions (here, the additions to section 667.5) facially targets a different problem (adult crime) with only incidental or peripheral effects on the ostensibly targeted problem, I do not believe all of the initiative's provisions are reasonably germane to each other or to the general purpose of the initiative.  (Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 245, 186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274.)   It is not fatal to an initiative's validity if its provisions have collateral effects outside its core purposes (ibid.), but I do not believe an initiative complies with the single-subject rule if its provisions only advance its core purposes as an indirect or collateral consequence of being applicable to all members of society.

Moreover, amalgamating the repeat offender provisions with the juvenile and gang provisions invokes our Supreme Court's concern, expressed in Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1142, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 988 P.2d 1089, about voter confusion and deception.   The title and findings, as well as the ballot arguments of the proponents and opponents, of Proposition 21 focused on the need to address juvenile and gang crime and contained no hint that its provisions also targeted adult offenders.   Although the Proposition 21 title and summary prepared by the Attorney General, and its analysis by the Legislative Analyst, briefly adverted to the additions to the serious and violent felonies list, the risk of voter confusion and deception is significant because the declared principal focus is to target juveniles and gangs, and scant attention is devoted to the distinct and significant impact of the initiative on persons who are neither juveniles nor gang members.   The People, noting that the ballot materials mention the violent offender provisions and include the complete text of the amendments, argue there cannot be either voter confusion or deception because “[w]e must assume the voters duly considered and comprehended these materials.”  (Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 349, 276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077.)   Although courts have previously indulged the fiction that voters read and understand complex ballot initiatives (see Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 243-244, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281;  Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 251-252, 186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274), I question how that fiction can coexist with Jones' affirmation that the single-subject rule safeguards against a combination of unrelated provisions that would confuse or mislead voters.  (Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1168, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 988 P.2d 1089.)   If voters are presumed to read and fully understand measures and hence are never confused or deceived, the single-subject rule would never serve its underlying purposes and would become the toothless rule that Jones specifically disavowed.  (Id. at p. 1158, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 988 P.2d 1089.)   I believe Jones effectively eschewed employment of this fiction for single-subject challenges.

I also believe Proposition 21's expansion of the list of serious felonies that qualify as prior felony convictions under the three strikes law violates the single-subject rule.   Proposition 21 accomplishes this expansion by first explicitly adding offenses to the list of serious felonies contained in section 1192.7, subdivision (c) and then enacting section 1170.125.  (Prop.21, §§ 16, 17.)   The explicit additions to the list of qualifying serious felonies include:  (1) exploding a device causing bodily injury (§ 12309);  (2) any assault on a peace officer or firefighter in violation of section 245;  (3) all violations of sections 245.2, 245.3 or 245.5;  (4) discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling, vehicle or aircraft (§ 246);  (5) shooting a firearm from a vehicle (§ 12034, subds.(c) and (d));  (6) intimidating victims and witnesses (§ 136.1);  (7) threats to commit a crime resulting in death or great bodily injury (§ 422);  (8) conspiracy to commit any serious felony (§ 182, subd. (a)(1));  and (9) any felony that would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22 of the STEP Act. Proposition 21 then adds section 1170.125, which retrofits the three strikes law to include as qualifying felonies all post-June 30, 1993, additions to the serious felonies list.7  The post-June 30, 1993, legislative additions to the serious felonies thus converted into qualifying serious felonies by section 1170.125 include a number of offenses added in 1998, including (1) throwing acid or flammable substances in violation of section 244;  (2) continuous sexual abuse of a child in violation of section 288.5;  (3) rape in concert in violation of section 264.1;  and (4) any violation of section 12022.53.  (See Stats.1998, ch. 936, § 13.5, p. 5436.)   It also converted carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)), an offense added to section 1192.7, subdivision (c) in October 1993 (see People v. Nava (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1732, 1736-1737, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 543), into a qualifying serious felony.

I view sections 16 and 17 of Proposition 21 as transgressing the policies and purposes of the single-subject rule in two distinct ways.   First, as with Proposition 21's additions to the violent felonies list, most of the newly-added serious felonies impact every offender, regardless of their ages or gang affiliations, because the three strikes consequences arise from the nature of the offense and not the characteristics of the offender.   I do not believe that increased punishment for all offenders can be considered reasonably germane to the subject of reducing juvenile or gang crime merely because juvenile and gang offenders are a subset of all offenders.8  Second, the danger that voters were confused or misled by Proposition 21's disparate provisions appears particularly applicable to the changes to the three strikes law made by sections 16 and 17 of Proposition 21.   The most conscientious voter could not determine from a review of the Title and Findings of the initiative or from the ballot arguments for or against the initiative that any changes were being made to the three strikes law.   Instead, a voter would discover these proposed changes only by reading the text of sections 16 and 17, and from the comments by the Attorney General and the Legislative Analyst that certain undisclosed changes were proposed.9  However, a voter reading the proposed text would be misled into believing that certain felonies-throwing acid or flammable substances in violation of section 244, continuous sexual abuse of a child in violation of section 288.5, rape in concert in violation of section 264.1, or violation of section 12022.53-were not among those currently deemed to be serious felonies under section 1192.7, subdivision (c), even though they had been added to the statute in 1998, because Proposition 21 lists those offenses in italics, which signify matters being added to the statute.10  Although section 16 of Proposition 21 might be necessary to convert the 1998 additions to section 1192.7, subdivision (c) into felonies qualifying for three strikes treatment, Proposition 21 is misleading insofar as it purports to add those offenses to section 1192.7, subdivision (c)'s serious felony list.  (Cf. Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1163-1166, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 988 P.2d 1089 [provision of proposed initiative requiring citizen approval of legislators' salary adjustments held not reasonably germane to problem of legislators' self-interest because it misleads by falsely implying that current law gave legislators control over own salary].)

 Wiretap Provisions

I believe one of the wiretap provisions of section 13 of Proposition 21 violates the single-subject rule.   This provision, which represents perhaps the starkest example of a stealth provision hidden within the mountain of material provided to the voters, amends the provisions of the wiretap statute to add two crimes to the list of violations for which a wiretap may be authorized:  violation of the STEP Act (new § 629.52, subd. (a)(3));  and violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 (§ 629.52, subd. (a)(1), as amended).   The majority opinion points out, and I agree, that adding a felony violation of the STEP Act to the crimes for which a wiretap may be authorized is reasonably germane to combating juvenile and gang crime.   However, I do not agree that permitting a wiretap when there is a suspected violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 is germane to combating juvenile and gang crime. Real Party in Interest and Amici Curiae seek to draw a nexus between this wiretap statute and juvenile/gang crime purposes of Proposition 21 by asserting that gangs and their juvenile members engage in narcotics trafficking to generate income, and therefore wiretaps in cases of suspected money laundering are germane to combating juvenile and gang crime.   However, Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 is not a money laundering offense.11  More importantly, Real Party in Interest's argument overlooks that this aspect of the wiretap law would never have any independent purpose or operation except in non-gang related contexts.   In any case in which a prosecutor suspects a person is violating Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 as part of his gang's narcotics business, that perpetrator would be committing a “felony violation of [the STEP Act]” for which a wiretap is authorized under new section 629.52, subdivision (a)(3).   The same possession of the cash by persons outside of the gang context would fall outside new section 629.52, subdivision (a)(3), and instead fall within section 629.52, subdivision (a)(1) as amended by Proposition 21.   It is precisely this latter context that is not reasonably germane to Proposition 21's purpose and other provisions.   To the extent this aspect of the wiretap provision is directed at gangs, it is redundant;  to the extent it is not redundant, it is not germane to the purposes of Proposition 21.

In addition to offending the germaneness requirement, I believe this wiretapping aspect of Proposition 21 violates the policy of the single-subject rule to protect voters from confusion and deception.   The ballot materials contain no hint of the presence of the provision adding Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 to the wiretap law.12  Instead, the only notice that this provision exists is the fact that, within a proposition containing innumerable subsections and thousands of words, a single number (i.e., 11370.6 ) is italicized in section 13 of the text of Proposition 21 included in the ballot.   This buried treasure, which appears to have no application in the sphere of gang- or juvenile-related crime, expands the authority of law enforcement to invade the important privacy interests of individual citizens.13  Although the electorate might be willing to sacrifice a portion of their privacy in the interests of combating the drug trade, it should do so knowingly and not on the basis of a rogue provision secreted into an unrelated measure.

Neither the repeat offender provisions nor the provisions of section 13 of Proposition 21, adding violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 to the wiretap provisions of section 629.52, are reasonably germane to the other parts of Proposition 21 or to its general purpose;  and therefore Proposition 21 violates the single-subject rule.   Because severance of the non-germane portions is not an available remedy (Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1168, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 988 P.2d 1089), Proposition 21 is invalid under article II, section 8, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Voters approved Proposition 21 at the General Election on March 7, 2000.   Section 602, subdivision (b)(1), is the codification of section 18 of that initiative and took effect March 8, 2000. (§ 602, subd. (b)(1), added by initiative, Gen. Elec. (March 7, 2000) [Proposition 21].)

FN2. All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified..  FN2. All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

3.   The complaint also alleged 13 counts of attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), or alternatively, 13 counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)).

4.   Petitioner also alleged Proposition 21 violates the constitutional separation of powers principles by improperly assigning judicial power to the executive branch, and violates the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.   Petitioner does not reassert those contentions in this writ proceeding.

5.   “Logrolling” is a method of exploiting the initiative process by taking disparate and unrelated provisions, none of which standing alone would have garnered a majority vote, and combining them into a single measure to cobble together a majority vote.  (See generally McFadden v. Jordan (1948) 32 Cal.2d 330, 345-346, 196 P.2d 787.)

6.   Other cases have also rejected single-subject challenges to multi-faceted initiatives because the provisions were reasonably germane to a unifying central purpose.  (See Raven v. Deukmejian, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 347, 276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077 [upholding the “Crime Victims Justice Reform Act” and concluding that its various provisions formed “a comprehensive criminal justice reform package”];  Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 231, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281 [upholding tax initiative on the ground that its varied provisions were “reasonably ․ germane to the general subject of property tax relief”];  Fair Political Practices Comm. v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 37, 157 Cal.Rptr. 855, 599 P.2d 46 [upholding Political Reform Act of 1974 despite its multiple complex features].)

7.   Sections 12 and 12.5 of Proposition 21 address the problem of graffiti, a crime that could reasonably be perceived as a problem common to both gangs and juveniles.

8.   The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention reported that, according to a “1998 National Youth Gang Survey,” the gang population is aging but despite this trend there were still 40 percent of gang members under the age of 18. ( [as of Nov. 28, 2001].)

9.   The courts had construed the provisions of sections 1192.7 and 667 as freezing the list of felonies that would qualify as strikes to the lists within those statutes as they existed on June 30, 1993.  (See, e.g., People v. O'Roark (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 872, 878-879, fn. 3, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 924.) Under section 1170.125, which changes the reference date from June 30, 1993, to March 8, 2000, all legislative additions to the lists that occurred between June 30, 1993 and March 8, 2000, as well as the additions made by Proposition 21, are converted into qualifying serious felonies.

10.   Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 provides:  “(a) Every person who possesses any moneys or negotiable instruments in excess of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) which have been obtained as the result of the unlawful sale, possession for sale, transportation, manufacture, offer for sale, or offer to manufacture any controlled substance listed in Section 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, or 11058, with knowledge that the moneys or negotiable instruments have been so obtained, and any person who possesses any moneys or negotiable instruments in excess of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) which are intended by that person for the unlawful purchase of any controlled substance listed in Section 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, or 11058 and who commits an act in substantial furtherance of the unlawful purchase, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years. [¶] (b) In consideration of the constitutional right to counsel afforded by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 15 of Article 1 of the California Constitution, when a case charged under subdivision (a) involves an attorney who accepts a fee for representing a client in a criminal investigation or proceeding, the prosecution shall additionally be required to prove that the moneys or negotiable instruments were accepted by the attorney with the intent to participate in the unlawful conduct described in subdivision (a) or to disguise or aid in disguising the source of the funds or the nature of the criminal activity. [¶] (c) In determining the guilt or innocence of a person charged under subdivision (a), the trier of fact may consider the following in addition to any other relevant evidence:  (1) The lack of gainful employment by the person charged.  [¶] (2) The expert opinion of a qualified controlled substances expert as to the source of the assets.  [¶] (3) The existence of documents or ledgers that indicate sales of controlled substances.”

11.   A number of the articles available relevant to address the issue of juvenile activity in street gangs include Dowie, “When Kids Commit Adult Crimes, Some Say They Should Do Adult Time” (Oct.1993) 13 Cal.L. 55, 58;  Hagedorn, Gang Violence in the Postindustrial Era (1998) 24 Crime & Just. 365, 393;  Elsea, The Juvenile Crime Debate:  Rehabilitation, Punishment, or Prevention (Fall 1995) Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 135, 136;  Princenthal, Crimes and Offenses (1998) 15 Ga. St. U.L.Rev. 80-84.

1.   The majority divides Proposition 21 into four subsets by characterizing the wiretap provisions as a discrete subset.   However, the majority then allocates one of the two wiretap provisions-the addition of a violation of the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (Pen.Code, § 186.20 et seq., referred to as the STEP Act) to the list of wiretap-authorized offenses-to two different subsets:  the gang subset and the wiretap subset.   I agree that the STEP Act violation aspect of the wiretap law belongs properly to the gang provision category.   However, the remaining wiretap provision is then a subset of one, which highlights my concern that it is indeed a rogue provision unrelated to the purposes and provisions concerning gang and juvenile crime.

2.   Sections 3 through 10 of Proposition 21 amend portions of the STEP Act, which is designed to combat violent street gangs.   Section 11 of Proposition 21 adds gang-related murder as a special circumstance, and portions of Section 15 of Proposition 21 add two gang-related crimes to the provisions of Penal Code section 667.5.   A portion of section 13 of Proposition 21 amends the wiretap statute (Pen.Code, § 629.52) to add violation of the STEP Act to the crimes for which wiretaps may be authorized;  however, a separate portion of section 13 also amends the wiretap statute to add violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 (possession of funds in excess of $100,000 related to illegal drugs) to the crimes for which a wiretap may be authorized.   The inclusion of this latter provision within Proposition 21 is itself a violation of the single-subject rule.

3.   Sections 18 through 34 amend various portions of the Welfare and Institutions Code to alter various aspects of the juvenile justice system, including:  expanding the list of offenders who must (Prop.21, § 18), or in the prosecutor's discretion may (Prop.21, § 26), be prosecuted in adult court;  changing the procedures and standards for revoking a juvenile's probation (Prop.21, § 27);  reducing in various ways the confidentiality previously afforded to juvenile offenders (Prop. 21, §§ 19, 25 & 30);  and making other changes pertaining to juvenile offenders.

4.   All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

5.   Section 15 of Proposition 21 also added two gang-related offenses to the violent felony list:  extortion for gang purposes in violation of the STEP Act (§§ 518/186.22) or threats or intimidation of victims or witnesses for gang purposes in violation of the STEP Act (§§ 136.1/186.22).   I agree that adding those two provisions to the section 667.5 list of violent felonies is reasonably germane to the other provisions and the purposes of Proposition 21;  my disagreement with the majority involves whether the other additions made by section 15 of Proposition 21 are also reasonably germane to Proposition 21's other provisions and central purpose.

6.   The majority opinion, in a continuation of its refrain that harsher punishment of juveniles under the “three strikes” law is reasonably germane to Proposition 21's central purpose of reducing juvenile and gang crime, notes that another consequence of adding an offense to the violent felony list is to qualify that offense as a strike “if that crime is not also a serious felony.”   This observation, although true, is irrelevant because it appears that all of the offenses added by Proposition 21 to the violent felony list were already listed as serious felonies (see former § 1192.7, subds. (c)(10), (14), (15), (16), (18), (19), (20), (27) & (28)), and most would have qualified as strikes, even had Section 15 of Proposition 21 not added them to the violent felony list.

7.   The courts had construed the provisions of sections 1192.7 and 667 as freezing the list of felonies that would qualify as strikes to the lists within those statutes as they existed on June 30, 1993.  (See, e.g., People v. O'Roark (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 872, 878-879, fn. 3, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 924.) Under Section 1170.125, which changes the reference date from June 30, 1993, to March 8, 2000, all legislative additions to the lists that occurred between June 30, 1993 and March 8, 2000, as well as the additions made by Proposition 21, are converted into qualifying serious felonies under the three strikes law.

8.   The majority concludes that the additions to the serious felony list are reasonably germane to combating juvenile crime because they expand the list of felonies that can be the subject of a juvenile adjudication and count as strikes under section 667, subdivision (d)(3) if the juvenile later reoffends.   It is true that five of the felonies added to section 1192.7, subdivision (c) (e.g. violation of sections 186.22, 246, 136.1, 245, subd. (a) and 12034, subd. (c)) had previously been listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) but not in section 1192.7, subdivision (c), and therefore would not qualify as strikes if the juvenile subsequently reoffended.  (See People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 980 P.2d 829.) The majority reasons that closing this loophole is reasonably germane to combating juvenile crime because juveniles will be deterred from committing these crimes as a result of the collateral consequences attached to these offenses.   Even if adding these five offenses to section 1192.7, subdivision (c) is reasonably germane to combating juvenile crime by closing this loophole, the remainder of the additions to the serious felony list do not have any similar loophole-closing germaneness to combating juvenile or gang crime.

9.   The Attorney General's “Official Title and Summary” states only that Proposition 21 “[d]esignates additional crimes as violent and serious felonies, thereby making offenders subject to longer sentences.”   The “Analysis by the Legislative Analyst” states only that “[t]his measure revises the list of specific crimes defined as serious or violent offenses, thus making most of them subject to the longer sentence provisions of existing law related to serious or violent offenses.   In addition, these crimes would count as ‘strikes' under the Three Strikes law.”  (See Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (March 7, 2000) pp. 44-47.)   These unilluminating comments do not disclose or even summarize the content of these proposed changes and require the voter to parse the text of the ballot measure to determine the extent of the actual changes.

10.   The text of Proposition 21 informs the voters that the initiative “amends, repeals, and adds sections to the Penal Code ․;   therefore, existing provisions proposed to be deleted are printed in strikeout type and new provisions proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new.”

11.   Contrary to the arguments posited by Real Party in Interest and Amici Curiae, Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 does not criminalize the laundering of narcotics proceeds.   Instead, it seeks to stem large-scale drug operations by making it a felony to possess cash in excess of $100,000 with certain culpable knowledge or intent.  (People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 797, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 150.)   Although money laundering is a felony, that crime is defined and punished by sections 186.10 and 186.11.

12.   The Attorney General's summary of Proposition 21 states only that the proposition “authorizes wiretapping for gang activities.”   However, adding Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 to section 629.52 provides authority for wiretapping in non-gang contexts.

13.   Our Legislature, by expressly recognizing that eavesdropping on private communications “has created a serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties and cannot be tolerated in a free and civilized society” (§ 630), has at least indirectly recognized that an individual citizen has an important privacy interest in being free from eavesdropping.

HUFFMAN, Acting P.J.

I CONCUR:  NARES, J.

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