Motion to Amend Mandate Denied June 16, 1947
See 331 U.S. 794 , 67 S.Ct. 1725.
Messrs. H. Wayne Unger, of Walterboro, S.C., and James P. Mozingo, of Darlington, S.C., for petitioner.
Messrs. Christie Benet, of Columbia, S.C., and Charles W. Waring of Charleston, S.C., for respondent.
Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner brought this action in a South Carolina state court. Upon motion of respondent, it was removed to the Federal District Court because of diversity [330 U.S. 212, 213] of citizenship of the parties. The complaint claimed $25,000 damages upon allegations that the respondent's agents had trespassed upon and cut timber from lands owned by and in the possession of the petitioner. Respondent's answer denied that the petitioner had title or possession of the lands and timbers. Both title and possession became crucial issues in the trial. The burden of proving them rested on the petitioner. 1 When all the evidence of both parties had been introduced, the respondent moved for a directed verdict in its favor on the ground that the petitioner had failed to prove that he either owned or was in possession of the land. 2 This motion was denied. The jury returned a verdict for petitioner for $15, 000, and the court entered judgment on the verdict. The respondent moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. This motion was denied. Respondent did not move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as it might have done under Rule 50(b) of the [330 U.S. 212, 214] Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is set out below. 3
The Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the admission of certain evidence offered by the petitioner to prove legal title was prejudicial error. It held that without this improperly admitted evidence petitioner's proof was not sufficient to submit the question of title to the jury. That court also held that petitioner's evidence showing possession was insufficient to go to the jury. It therefore reversed the case. But instead of remanding it to the District Court for a new trial, the Circuit Court of Appeals directed that judgment be entered for respondent. That court has thus construed Rule 50(b) as authorizing an appellate court to direct a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, even though no motion for such a judgment had been made in the District Court within ten days after the jury's discharge.
The petition for certiorari challenged the power of an appellate court to direct entry of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict where timely motion for such a judg- [330 U.S. 212, 215] ment had not been made in the District Court. On three previous occasions we have granted certiorari to consider this point but failed to reach it because, upon examination of the evidence, we found it sufficient to justify submission of all three cases to the jury. Conway v. O'Brien, 312 U.S. 492 , 61 S.Ct. 634; Berry v. United States, 312 U.S. 450 , 61 S.Ct. 637; Halliday v. United States, 315 U.S. 94 , 62 S. Ct. 438. In this case we granted certiorari 'limited to the questions of federal procedure raised by the petition for the writ.' 329 U.S. 701 , 67 S.Ct. 57. The point we had in mind was whether a party's failure to make a motion in th District Court for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as permitted in Rule 50(b), precludes an appellate court from directing entry of such a judgment. Other questions have been discussed here, but we do not consider them. Consequently, we accept, without approving or disapproving, the Circuit Court of Appeals' holding that there was prejudicial error in the admission of evidence and in the submission of the case to the jury.
Rule 50(b) contains no language which absolutely requires a trial court to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict even though that court is persuaded that it erred in failing to direct a verdict for the losing party. The rule provides that the trial court 'may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed.' This 'either-or' language means what it seems to mean, namely, that there are circumstances which might lead the trial court to believe that a new trial rather than a final termination of the trial stage of the controversy would better serve the ends of justice. In short, the rule does not compel a trial judge to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict instead of ordering a new trial; it permits him to exercise a discretion to choose between the two alternatives. See Berry v. United States, supra, 312 U.S. 452 , [330 U.S. 212, 216] 453, 61 S.Ct. 638.4 And he can exercise this discretion with a fresh personal knowledge of the issues involved, the kind of evidence given, and the impression made by witnesses. His appraisal of the bona fides of the claims asserted by the litigants is of great value in reaching a conclusion as to whether a new trial should be granted. Determination of whether a new trial should be granted or a judgment entered under Rule 50(b) calls for the judgment in the first instance of the judge who saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel of the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart. See March v. Philadelphia & West Chester Traction Co., 285 Pa. 413, 418, 132 A. 355; Bunn v. Furstein, 153 Pa.Super. 637, 638, 34 A.2d 924. See also Yutterman v. Sternberg, 8 Cir., 86 F.2d 321, 324, 111 A.L.R. 736. Exercise of this discretion presents to the trial judge an opportunity, after all his rulings have been made and all the evidence has been evaluated, to view the proceedings in a perspective peculiarly available to him alone. He is thus afforded 'a last chance to correct his own errors without delay, expense, or other hardships of an appeal.' See Greer v. Carpenter, 323 Mo. 878, 882, 19 S.W.2d 1046, 1047; Cf. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 112 , 66 S.Ct. 464, 466. [330 U.S. 212, 217] There are other practical reasons why a litigant should not have his right to a new trial foreclosed without having had the benefit of the trial court's judgment on the question. Take the case where a trial court is about to direct a verdict because of failure of proof in a certain aspect of the case. At that time a litigant might know or have reason to believe that he could fill the crucial gap in the evidence. Traditionally, a plaintiff in such a dilemma has had an unqualifi d right, upon payments of costs, to take a nonsuit in order to file a new action after further preparation, unless the defendant would suffer some plain legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit. Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116, 122; Jones v. S.E.C., 298 U.S. 1, 19 , 20 S., 56 S.Ct. 654, 659, and cases cited. Rule 41(a)(1) preserves this unqualified right of the plaintiff to a dismissal without prejudice prior to the filing of defendant's answer. And after the filing of an answer, Rule 41(a)(2) still permits a trial court to grant a dismissal without prejudice 'upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.'