WPC6 2~ ZBVXXN\  PXPa1DocumentDocument StyleF *  ׃  a2DocumentDocument Style*    a3DocumentDocument Style0     2Zpe epa4DocumentDocument Style . a5DocumentDocument Style   a6DocumentDocument Style   a7DocumentDocument Style ` ` ` 2p   Ha8DocumentDocument Style` ` ` a1TechnicalTechnical Document Style 4!     a2TechnicalTechnical Document Style *    a3TechnicalTechnical Document Style '    2/  'a4TechnicalTechnical Document Style &    a5TechnicalTechnical Document Style &  . a6TechnicalTechnical Document Style&  . a7TechnicalTechnical Document Style&  . 2 a  w  a8TechnicalTechnical Document Style&   . a1Right ParRight-Aligned Paragraph Numbers8!"@   a2Right ParRight-Aligned Paragraph NumbersA#$@` `  ` ` ` a3Right ParRight-Aligned Paragraph NumbersJ%&@  ` `  2  K  a4Right ParRight-Aligned Paragraph NumbersS'(@  a5Right ParRight-Aligned Paragraph Numbers\)*@hh# hhh a6Right ParRight-Aligned Paragraph Numberse+,@( hh# a7Right ParRight-Aligned Paragraph Numbersn-.@- ( 2p0a8Right ParRight-Aligned Paragraph Numbersw/0@pp2 -ppp     ЊX0Í Í X0Í Í Single Space 1 2Roman 12ptRoman Courier 12pt'34#d6X@@#2BT5nIOp. DraftOpinion -- Draft56  (c#j\  P6;XPH#   3 1, 4 @&D R A F T` APage  _______________________________________________________ Italic 12ptItalics Courier 12pt type'78'#x6NhH##x6NhH#BibliogrphyBibliography9: Doc InitInitialize Document Style;<    I. 1. A. a.(1)(a) i) a)DocumentҲ2t H\!"MTech InitInitialize Technical Style=> 1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 TechnicalPleadingHeader for numbered pleading paper ?@   ,#j\  P6;XPH# X  y*dddyy*dddy H\1 H\2 H\3 H\4 H\5 H\6 H\7 H\8 H\9 H10 H11 H12 H13 H14 H15 H16 H17 H18 H19 H20 H21 H22 H23 H24 H25 H26 H27 H28   Home PtrSets codes for printing opinions on Sperry Laser!QAB X #Xx6X@X@#  EnvelopeEnvelope"CD '3 II    Xp,  p,p, 2#$%v&pLetter 2Personal stationery with standard margins#bEF#XN\  P XP#   p,  3 1, 4 Letter 3Personal stationery with narrow margins$bGH#&R2P &P#     3 1, 4 Letter 1Court stationery%PIJ#XZ2P XP# * 3 1, 4 ؃ 1Document Style&KL` ` ` 2!'q(e1 )e * 2Document Style'M N . 3Document Style( OP 4Document Style) QR 5Document Style**ST   2#+p!,0"-".]#6Document Style+UV` ` ` 7Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers,8WX@   8Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers-AYZ@` `  ` ` ` 9Document Style.0[ \    2&/$$0$1u%2+&10Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers/J]^@  ` `  11Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers0S_`@  12Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers1\ab@hh# hhh 13Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers2ecd@( hh# 2)3'4'5(6o)14Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers3nef@- ( 15Right-Aligned Paragraph Numbers4wgh@pp2 -ppp 16Document Style5Fij *  ׃  17Technical Document Style6&kl  . 2p,7&*8*9G+:+18Technical Document Style7&mn  . 19Technical Document Style8*op    20Technical Document Style9'qr   21Technical Document Style:&st   2b6;,<R-=-0\.22Technical Document Style;4u$v     23Technical Document Style<&wx  . 24Technical Document Style=&yz  . īXN\  PXPx9 Z6Times New Roman RegularXj\  P6;XPH%\  `$Times New RomanXXN\  PXPx9 Z6Times New Roman RegularXd6X@@<6X9`("Courier NewTTj\  P6;XPH%\  `$Times New RomanXx6NhHH  9`(.Courier NewItalicTTx6NhHH  9`(.Courier NewItalicTTj\  P6;XPH%\  `$Times New RomanXXx6X@X@<6X9`("Courier NewTTXXN\  P XP% [  `*Times New RomanTTX&R2P &P7|A`$ArialTT&XZ2P XP& A`ArialTTX2663|x    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS ă & &No. 961241ă & Robert August Bocquet, the Estate of Phillip Edmund Bocquet, deceased, Malcolm Oscar Bocquet, Blanche Eugenia Beechie, Willie Granata, R. G. Weyel, Glenn Howard, Oliver W. Howard, and wife, Lorraine M. Howard, Louis J. Pantusa, et al., Petitioners  *v.ă Earl Herring and wife, Florence Canales Herring, Respondents   On Application for Writ of Error to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texasă  * Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Phillips, Justice Gonzalez, Justice Spector, Justice Owen, Justice Abbott, and Justice Hankinson join. Justice Baker issued a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Enoch joins. The Declaratory Judgments Act provides that in any proceeding under the Act the court may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorneys fees as are equitable and just. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 37.009. The question here is, by what standard is such an award of attorney fees to be reviewed on appeal. Earl Herring and his wife sued two groups of defendants, the Bocquet parties and the Weyel parties, for a judgment declaring that defendants were not entitled to access their property by means of a roadway easement on the Herrings property. Defendants counterclaimed for a declaration of   their rights and for tort damages. On crossmotions for summary judgment, the district court granted judgment for defendants and severed their claims for attorney fees and damages. The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, and we denied plaintiffs application for writ of error. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1180 (July 28, 1994). The defendants nonsuited their tort claims, and the parties then tried defendants claim for attorney fees to the bench. The district court awarded $50,000 to the Bocquet parties, $45,000 to the Weyel parties, and $7,500 to all defendants jointly in the event the Herrings appealed unsuccessfully. The Herrings appealed, arguing that the attorney fee award was an abuse of discretion, was not supported by factually or legally sufficient evidence, and was not equitable or just. While the appeal was pending, the Herrings settled with the Weyel parties. The court of appeals held that [t]he standard of review is an abuse of discretion, 933 S.W.2d at 613, that whether attorney fees are reasonable and necessary ... must be decided by the fact finder, id. at 614, that the trial courts findings are only to be disturbed if there is an abuse of discretion, id., and that both the time and the amount awarded to the appellees[] attorneys [was] excessive, id. at 615. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial unless the Bocquet parties remitted $23,750 of their award. In so doing the appeals court appears to have sustained the Hennings second point of error complaining of the insufficiency of the evidence. The Bocquet parties did not remit but instead appealed to this Court. To determine the correct standard of review, we look first to the statute. The Declaratory Judgments Act does not require an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. Rather, it provides that the court may award attorney fees. The statute thus affords the trial court a measure of discretion in deciding whether to award attorney fees or not. Commissioners Court v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1997); Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 637638 (Tex. 1996); Texas Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 444446 (Tex. 1994); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 398399 (Tex. 1989); Duncan v. Pogue, 759 S.W.2d 435, 435436 (Tex. 1988); Oake v. Collin County, 692 S.W.2d 454, 455456 (Tex. 1985). The same is true of other statutes that provide that a court may award attorney fees. E.g. City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464, 474 (Tex. 1996) (applying Tex. Loc. Govt Code 143.015(c)); Bruni v. Bruni, 924 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. 1996) (reviewing fees in suits affecting the parentchild relationship under former Tex. Fam. Code 11.18(a), recodified as 106.002). Statutes providing that a party may recover, shall be awarded, or is entitled to attorney fees are not discretionary. E.g., D.F.W. Christian Television, Inc. v. Thornton, 933 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex. 1996) (applying Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 38.001(8)); Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997) (discussing "reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees" under Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 17.50(d)); Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 790 S.W.2d 77, 86 (Tex. App."Dallas 1990), affd in part and revd in part on other grounds, 801 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1990) (applying former Tex. Elec. Code 251.008, recodified as 253.131). The Act imposes four limitations on the courts discretion. The first is that fees must be reasonable. In general, [t]he reasonableness of attorneys fees, the recovery of which is authorized by ... statute, is a question of fact for the jurys determination. Trevino v. American Natl Ins. Co., 168 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. 1943). Accord: Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 941 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Tex. 1997); Snoke v. Republic Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam); Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Britton, 406 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Tex. 1966); Gulf Paving Co. v. Lofstedt, 188 S.W.2d 155, 160161 (Tex. 1945); Johnson v. Universal Life & Accident Ins. Co., 94 S.W.2d 1145, 1146 (Tex. 1936). The second limitation, that fees must be necessary, is likewise a fact question. General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 961 (Tex. 1996). There are, of course, factors prescribed by law which guide the determination of whether attorney fees are reasonable and necessary. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 818 (quoting Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof. Conduct 1.04, reprinted in Tex. Govt Code., tit. 2, subtit. G app. (State Bar Rules, art. X, 9)). The Acts other two limitations on attorney fees awards are that they must be equitable and just. Matters of equity are addressed to the trial courts discretion. Knebel v. Capital Natl Bank, 518 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. 1974); Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. 1939). So is the responsibility for just decisions. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699700 (Tex. 1981); Carle v. Carle, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (Tex. 1950). In sum, then, the Declaratory Judgments Act entrusts attorney fee awards to the trial courts sound discretion, subject to the requirements that any fees awarded be reasonable and necessary, which are matters of fact, and to the additional requirements that fees be equitable and just, which are matters of law. It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to rule arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without regard to guiding legal principles, e.g., Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997), or to rule without supporting evidence, Beaumont Bank v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991). Therefore, in reviewing an attorney fee award under the Act, the court of appeals must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding fees when there was insufficient evidence that the fees were reasonable and necessary, or when the award was inequitable or unjust. Unreasonable fees cannot be awarded, even if the court believed them just, but the court may conclude that it is not equitable or just to award even reasonable and necessary fees. This multifaceted review involving both evidentiary and discretionary matters is required by the language of the Act. In the present case, we find nothing to indicate that the district courts attorney fee award was unjust or inequitable, and there was some evidence to support it. The court of appeals did not reach a contrary conclusion. Although the court of appeals opinion is not completely clear on the matter, we read it to sustain the Herrings complaint that the evidence of reasonableness and necessity of attorney fees was factually insufficient, given the courts conclusions that the fees awarded were excessive and that a remittitur was appropriate. It would be an abuse of discretion for the district court to award fees without factually sufficient supporting evidence. But before the court of appeals could reach that conclusion, it was required to detail all relevant evidence and explain why the evidence was factually insufficient. Rose v. Doctors Hospital, 801 S.W.2d 841, 848 (Tex. 1990). This it did not do. Accordingly, the Court grants the Bocquet parties application for writ of error and, without hearing oral argument, reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands the case to that court to redetermine the factual sufficiency of the evidence of the reasonableness and necessity of the attorney fees awarded by the district court. Tex. R. App. P. 59.1. The determination should be made in light of the standards prescribed in Rule 1.04 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. If the court finds the evidence sufficient, the district courts judgment must be affirmed; if the court finds the evidence insufficient, it may affirm conditioned on a remittitur or remand for further proceedings. #j\  P6;XPH# Single Space` ` ` hhh`(#(#Kă ` ` ` hhhNathan L. Hecht ` ` ` hhhJustice Opinion delivered: April 14, 1998#Single Space##XN\  PXP#