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Garrett, Petitioners  *v.ă Garrison Contractors, Inc., Respondent   On Application for Writ of Error to the ! Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texasă  l Argued on October 7, 1997 ă Justice Spector delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Phillips, Justice Hecht, Justice Enoch, Justice Owen, Justice Abbott, and Justice Hankinson join. Justice Baker, joined by Justice Gonzalez, filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.  The primary issue in this case is whether an insurance agent employed by an insurance company is a person under section 2(a) of Article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. The court of appeals held that Robert Garrett, a Liberty Mutual Insurance Company employeeagent, was a person under that provision, and accordingly subject to suit under section 16 of Article 21.21. We affirm. *I. In 1986, the president of Garrison Contractors, Inc. contacted Robert Garrett to obtain an insurance quote on the companys workers compensation, general liability, and automobile liability insurance from Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Garrett was a Liberty employeeagent whose duties included soliciting and obtaining insurance policy sales for Liberty as well as explaining policy provisions and premium calculations to customers. After meeting with Garrett, Garrison purchased a threeyear, multiline insurance policy from Liberty. The policy featured a retrospective premium plan, in which a base premium is paid, then adjusted based on actual losses. If losses are less than expected, the insurer refunds part of the base premium. If losses are greater than expected, the insured owes additional premiums. During the policy period, Garrison paid both base premiums and retrospective premiums. When the policy period ended, Liberty billed Garrison $159,371.85 more in retrospective premiums. Garrison refused to pay and Liberty sued to collect the premiums. Garrison counterclaimed against Liberty and filed a thirdparty claim against Garrett. Claiming that Liberty and Garrett misrepresented the retrospective premium terms, Garrison alleged commonlaw bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, DTPA violations, and Insurance Code violations. The trial court granted Liberty and Garretts motion for summary judgment on Garrisons counterclaim against Liberty and its thirdparty claim against Garrett. The trial court also granted Libertys motion for summary judgment on its sworn account suit against Garrison. The court of appeals affirmed Libertys summary judgment, disallowing Garrisons claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and breach of fiduciary duty. However, the court of appeals reversed the summary judgment for Liberty and Garrett against Garrisons DTPA and Insurance Code claims. The court of appeals held, in part, that material fact issues remained about the alleged policy misrepresentations, and that Garrison had a cause of action against Garrett individually on both the DTPA and Insurance Code claims.?#A\  PP#э Liberty and Garretts summary judgment motion did not assert that Garrisons DTPA claims against Garrett individually were precluded. Instead, the summary judgment motion focused on Garretts individual liability under the Insurance Code. Likewise, on appeal, the defendants do not argue about Garretts individual liability under the DTPA. Accordingly, we express no opinion on the issue of whether there may be individual DTPA liability against an insurance company employee.? Finally, the court of appeals reversed the summary judgment on Libertys sworn account claim because Garrisons summary judgment proof raised a fact issue on whether there was agreement between the parties regarding price due to the alleged misrepresentations. We granted Liberty and Garretts application for writ of error primarily to consider whether an insurance company employee is a person under section 2(a) of Article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. )II. ă Our objective when we construe a statute is to determine and give effect to the Legislatures intent. Tex. Govt Code  312.005; Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tex. 1997). We accomplish that purpose, first, by looking to the plain and common meaning of the statutes words. See Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex. 1993). We must also view a statutes terms in context and give them full effect. See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. GlynJones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex. 1994); Republicbank Dallas, N.A. v. Interkal, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex. 1985). A statutes legislative history may also be helpful in divining the Legislatures intent. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. North Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1, 908 S.W.2d 415, 422 (Tex. 1995). Finally, we bear in mind the old law, the evil, and the remedy. Tex. Govt Code 312.005.The purpose of Article 21.21 is to regulate trade practices in the business of insurance by defining, or providing for the determination of, all such practices in this state which constitute unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices and by prohibiting the trade practices so defined or determined. Tex. Ins. Code art. 21.21,  1(a) (emphasis added). Section 3 of Article 21.21 prohibits any person from engaging in deceptive trade practices in the insurance business, and section 16 provides a private cause of action against a person that engages in an act or practice declared in section 4 of the article to be unfair or deceptive. Id.  16(a). In addition, the Texas Department of Insurance and the attorney general are authorized to take enforcement actions against any person who engages in deceptive acts or practices. See id.  6, 7, 15.  Person means any individual, corporation, association, partnership, reciprocal exchange, interinsurer, Lloyds insurer, fraternal benefit society, and any other legal entity engaged in the business of insurance, including agents, brokers, adjusters and life insurance counselors. Id.  2(a) (emphasis added). Liberty and Garrett contend that the definition only reaches business entities, and not the entities employees; employees, they contend, do not engage in the business of insurance, but engage in their employers business. They argue that no purpose is served by including employees like Garrett in the definition of person because an insurance company will always be liable for its employees activities in the course and scope of employment. See Celtic Life Ins. Co. v. Coats, 885 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. 1994) (citing Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Bar Consultants, 577 S.W.2d 688, 693-94 (Tex. 1979)). We disagree. First, the legislative history of a 1985 amendment to Article 21.21 supports the conclusion that the term person is not limited to business entities. In the 1985 session, the Legislature modified section 16 of Article 21.21. That section had formerly provided a cause of action for unfair or deceptive insurance practices against the company or companies engaging in such acts or practices. Act of May 9, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 143,  2(c), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 322, 338 (amended 1985) (current version at Tex. Ins. Code art. 21.21,  16) (emphasis added). The Legislature amended section 16 to provide a cause of action against a person or persons engaging in unfair or deceptive practices, rather than a company or companies. Act of March 19, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 22,  3, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 395 (current version at Tex. Ins. Code art. 21.21,  16). The word company is commonly understood to mean a business enterprise; firm. American Heritage Dictionary 384 (3d ed. 1992). Thus, the Legislatures change of the word company to the term person is highly suggestive: if the Legislature intended the term person to have the narrow meaning that Liberty and Garrett would give it, this alter are within the statutory definition. But we do not lightly presume that the Legislature may have done a useless act. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 551 (Tex. 1981). Additionally, we have previously noted that the term business of insurance in Article 21.21 is connected with and used with reference to a particular trade or subject matter. Great American Ins. Co., 908 S.W.2d at 421 (citing Tex. Govt Code  312.002(b)). Therefore, the Legislature has instructed us to assign the term the meaning given by experts in the particular trade, subject matter, or art. Tex. Govt Code  312.002(b). In this case, the Department of Insurance has appeared as an amicus curiae. The Departments expertise in the insurance trade is unquestionable: it was created to regulate the business of insurance in this state. Tex. Ins. Code art. 1.01A(b). The Department maintains that an insurance company employee may engage in the business of insurance, and therefore, may be a person under Article 21.21. The Departments regulations reflect that position. The Department is authorized to promulgate . . . and enforce reasonable rules and regulations . . . necessary in the accomplishment of the purposes of Article 21.21. Tex. Ins. Code art. 21.21,  13(a). Exercising that power, the Department has adopted section 21.1 of Title 28 of the Texas Administrative Code. That rule provides: It is the purpose of these sections to further define and state the standards that are necessary to prohibit deceptive acts or deceptive practices by insurers and insurance agents and other persons in their conduct of the business of insurance . . . irrespective of whether the person is acting as insurer, principal, agent, employer, or employee, or in other capacity or connection with such insurer. 28 Tex. Admin. Code  21.1 (West 1997) (emphasis added). Liberty and Garrett maintain that some individuals, such as independent agents and brokers, are persons under Article 21.21, while individuals who are employed by insurance companies are not. If we were to accept that view, however, it would create anomalous results. An independent agent would be subject to suit under section 16 of Article 21.21 (and to enforcement action under sections 7 and 15) for misrepresenting a policys terms, while an employeeagent would not. That result is contrary to the Legislatures intent to comprehensively regulate and prohibit deceptive insurance practices. See Tex. Ins. Code art. 21.21,  1(a). Liberty and Garrett also assert that our reasoning in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Watson precludes a holding that insurance company employees are persons under Article 21.21. 876 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1994). In Watson, we held that a thirdparty claimant lacked standing to sue her adversarys carrier under Article 21.21. Id. at 150. Watson, however, is simply inapposite because this case does not involve a thirdparty claim. Liberty and Garrett next argue that section 23 of article 21.21 decides the issue here. Section 23 provides that [t]hose civil penalties, premium refunds, judgments, compensatory judgments, individual recoveries, orders, class action awards, costs, damages, or attorneys fees which are assessed or awarded as provided in this Article shall be paid only from the capital or surplus funds of the offending insurance company. Tex. Ins. Code art. 21.21,  23. Liberty and Garrett contend that because section 23 only refers to payment of judgments by an offending insurance company, the Legislature has limited article 21.21's remedies to recovery against insurance companies. See id.  23. We disagree. While section 23 restricts how an offending insurance company may satisfy a judgment under article 21.21, it does not limit the scope of section 2(a). Finally, a number of other statutes define person similarly to Article 21.21. Like Article 21.21, these statutes first list an individual among the regulated class, followed by various types of legal entities, followed by the general catch phrase any other legal entity. See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat arts. 4447cc,  3(a)(6) (Environmental Health and Safety Audit Privilege Act), 4542a1,  5(31) (Texas Pharmacy Act), 5221l,  6(j) (Health Spa Act), 8407a,  4(j) (Texas Barber Law), and 9023c,  1(4) (solicitations by public safety organizations, publications, and independent promoters); Tex. Health & Safety Code  341.001(5) (Minimum Standards of Sanitation and Health Protection Measures); Tex. Health & Safety Code  361.003(23) (Solid Waste Disposal Act); Tex. Health & Safety Code  382.003(10) (Clean Air Act); Tex. Health & Safety Code  481.002(33) (Texas Controlled Substances Act); Tex. Nat. Res. Code  131.004(16) (Uranium Surface Mining and Reclamation Act); Tex. Water Code  31.001(6) (subsurface evacuations). If, as the dissent would hold, the definition encompasses only legal entities under Article 21.21, individual employees would also not be regulated (or protected) under other laws that similarly define person. We emphasize, however, that not every employee of an insurance company is a person under Article 21.21 and therefore subject to suit under section 16. To come within the statute, an employee must engage in the business of insurance. In this case, Garrett personally carried out the transaction that forms the core of Garrisons complaint. Garrett testified that his job responsibilities included soliciting and obtaining insurance policy sales and explaining policy terms to prospective buyers. He was also responsible for explaining premium calculations to consumers. Garrett was thus required to have a measure of expertise in the field, which was necessary to perform his job. Clearly, Garrett was engaged in the business of insurance. On the other hand, an employee who has no responsibility for the sale or servicing of insurance policies and no special insurance expertise, such as a clerical worker or janitor, does not engage in the insurance business. ^) III. ă Liberty and Garrett argue, finally, that the court of appeals erred in remanding Garrisons DTPA and Insurance Code claims and related defenses to Libertys sworn account claim. We disagree. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because Garrison raised a material fact issue on whether Liberty and Garrett misrepresented the policy terms. 927 S.W.2d at 300. Alternatively, Liberty and Garrett contend that the court of appeals remanded too much because it held that only one of Garrisons grounds for recovery under the DTPA and Insurance Code was viable. The court of appeals compared some of the allegations in Garrisons summary judgment affidavits to claims that another court of appeals held were not actionable in Heritage Manor of Blaylock Properties, Inc. v. Petersson, 677 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Tex. App.Dallas 1984, writ refd n.r.e.). 927 S.W.2d at 300. But the court reversed the summary judgment because Garrisons affidavits created a fact issue on whether Liberty and Garrett violated the DTPA and Insurance Code by misrepresenting that the retrospective premiums would not exceed ten to fifteen percent of Garrisons 1986 premium. Id. Our decision in Coats controls our disposition of these points. In Coats, we held that an insurance company could be liable under the Insurance Code for its agents affirmative representations about the policy. 885 S.W.2d at 99. Garrison presented summary judgment evidence creating a fact issue on whether Liberty and Garrett misrepresented the policy terms by telling Garrison that the retrospective premiums were subject to a cap. Because Liberty and Garrett did not establish their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on Garrisons DTPA and Insurance Code claims and defenses, the court of appeals did not err in remanding.  @* * * We hold that section 16 of Article 21.21 provides a cause of action against insurance company employees whose job duties call for them to engage in the business of insurance. We also hold that the court of appeals properly remanded Libertys sworn account claim and Liberty and Garrisons Insurance Code and DTPA claims to the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. ` ` ` hhh  ` ` ` hhhRose Spector ` ` ` hhhJustice OPINION DELIVERED: April 14, 1998