ÿWPCY/ -X9U%«Ma–áZ]p=L·ˆA–àh ߎó¸=ú Õ¢kÙ:s¦–FŸñ-`5Öº9‘Ú$›ÚÀ(íŸÚ´(ðs¾8odIL$Ϲ™Ö°­Öâ/í¡ä¹›ãÂ}”Öƒ‚ –r©ˆèqªgÑ: 'ÓÅr™~“o—ÓõÜ÷´öOk­ÎS€5̨xš÷âðg!NÒký9ÓAÛqU.Ëw@ù49M\ m^ u 0Â{ 0D= 0@ „Á 0cE 1e¨ ¨ 1m Nz ^ | bˆ 1‡ Æ 0eÝ MB ÆF 0Z  0ef 0=Ë 0a 0>i 0h§ 0R 0Ra 0R³ 0R 0RW 09© 0žâ B€ 02 0úÏ 0:É 0V 0\Y 0Lµ 0 0  0— B*·! D3á! D+" 0™?" 0þØ# 06Ö$ 0 % 0:& 0hL& 0F´& Bú& B'U64'U<j'U*¦'Ð'Ð'›å'›€+U>/˜HP LaserJet 5MP,ð,,,,,ð0(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡´¤ìl9Z+&Courier Regular<þ6X9`(Courier õ¢Dö¢÷¢Dø¢Dù¢Dú¢Dû¢eü¢Dý¢þ¢™«Mq)DF3|xþ¢ ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀH(r(2|ß$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÔ€Xž¯XXXÔÔ€Xž¯XXXž¯ÔÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2c0Quick "ð"ðà0 à StricklandirregardlessLangstonarrearagesspousal(;³´$´´Ô2 eÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à$ÿÿ35;AGMSY_1A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.# e37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)ÄW)‰- ù-(5hCEKQW]cioAutoList1I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I., II.,Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 54#-†2Quick I.ÚƒÚÚ  Ú.à0 àÛ€ÛA, B,Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 50ÿÿ.NormalÔ S ÔÓ =jÓÓ =jÓ4#.^2Quick A.ÚƒÚÚ  Ú.à0 àÛ€Û<ÿÿ:Definition T<’’ÿÿ:Definition LÓ , ÓÓ†|Ü(ÜÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? AøCPF¨HKXM°OR`T¸VYh[À]†ÓÓ  ÓÓ†|°(°` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? AøCPF¨HKXM°OR`T¸VYh[À]`†Ó8ÿÿ6Definitionòòóó(­’ÿÿ&H1Ô S ÔÓ =jÓÔ&  Ôò òÔ€°°°ÔÓ 5ÓÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔÔ  Ôó óÔ€XXXÔÓ 1[ÓÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔÔ  Ô(¢‡ÿÿ&H2Ô S ÔÓ =jÓÔ&  Ôò òÔ€„„„ÔÓ ÔFÓÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔó óÔ€XXXÔÓ 1[ÓÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔ(¢‡ÿÿ&H3Ô S ÔÓ =jÓÔ&  Ôò òÔ€¼¼¼ÔÓ 1[ÓÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔó óÔ€XXXÔÓ 1[ÓÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔ(¢‡ÿÿ&H4Ô S ÔÓ =jÓÔ&  Ôò òÔ€XXXÔÓ =jÓÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔó óÓ =jÓÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔÔ€XXXÔ(¢‡ÿÿ&H5Ô S ÔÓ =jÓÔ&  Ôò òÔ€ôôôÔÓ €ÓÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔó óÔ€XXXÔÓ 1[ÓÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔ(¢‡ÿÿ&H6Ô S ÔÓ =jÓÔ&  Ôò òÔ€ÔÓ ŸÓÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔó óÔ€XXXÔÓ 1[ÓÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔ2ÿÿ0Addressòòóó8¹¬ÿÿ6BlockquoteÔ S ÔÓ =jÓÓ , ÓÓ , ÓÓ†|Ü(ÜÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? AøCPF¨HKXM°OR`T¸VYh[À]†ÓÓ  ÓÓ  ÓÓ†|°(°` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? AøCPF¨HKXM°OR`T¸VYh[À]`†ÓÓ =jÓ d,ÿÿ*CITEòòóó,djÿÿ*CODEÔ€ôôôÔÔK€@<þ6X9`(Courier NewKÔÔ€XXXÔÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔ4ÿÿ2Emphasisòòóó6ÿÿ4HyperlinkòòÔ ÿ ÔóóÔ  Ô<ÿÿ:FollowedHypeòòÔ €€ ÔóóÔ  Ô>c$"Small Circleð"ðà0 à4gmÿÿ2Keyboardò òÔ€ôôôÔÔK€@<þ6X9`(Courier NewKÔó óÔ€XXXÔÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔ<êðÿÿ:PreformattedÓ†|°(°Ïî ,KkŠ©È (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? AøCPF¨HKXM°OR`T¸VYh[À]`pbÈd g†ÓÔ€ôôôÔÔK€@<þ6X9`(Courier NewKÔÔ€XXXÔÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔÓ†|°(°Ïî ,KkŠ©È (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? AøCPF¨HKXM°OR`T¸VYh[À]`pbÈd g†Ó<¬®ÿÿ:z©Bottom of Ó?€5*€Ø **?ÓÓ  ÓÔB  ÔÔ€ÔÔ?€B%ä2¼A`Arial?ÔÓ/€6 € H/ÓÓ  ÓÔ€XXXÔÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔ&ÿÿ0 d d4444'þÿÈÈÈÈdxd'ÈÈÈÈdxd<®®ÿÿ:z©Top of ForÓA€54*€Ø**AÓÓ  ÓÔB  ÔÔ€ÔÔ?€B%ä2¼A`Arial?ÔÓ/€6 € H/ÓÓ  ÓÔ€XXXÔÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔ0djÿÿ.SampleÔ€XXXÔÔK€@<þ6X9`(Courier NewKÔÔ€XXXÔÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔ0ÿÿ.Strongò òó ó8djÿÿ6TypewriterÔ€ôôôÔÔK€@<þ6X9`(Courier NewKÔÔ€XXXÔÔQ€Aô\  `$Times NewRomanQÔ4ÿÿ2Variableòòóó:ÿÿ8HTML MarkupÔB  ÔÔ ÿ ÔÔ  Ô2 ÿÿ0CommentÔB  Ôüÿ+ +dûÿX Xd<þ6X9`(Courier Newô\  `$Times NewRoman%ä2¼A`Arial Ñ  Ñ ‘Ý ƒ r°$ÝÑ @ ÑÔ€X9XXXÔÔ€X9XXX9ÔÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý›€The€Family€Law€Article€was€originally€enacted€by€Chapter€296Ð ° Ðof€Acts€of€1984.€€¢F.L.£€ðð€11„101€replaced€Md.€Ann.€Code€(1957€Code,Ï1981€Repl.€Vol.),€Art.€16,€ðð€1(a).€€That€section€provided,€in€part:€ÏÌà8  àò òðð€1.€€Award€when€divorce,€annulment€or€alimony€granted.ó óÐÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(a)€òòAwardóó.€ð"ð€In€granting€a€limited€or€absoluteÐ ˜è Ðdivorce,€annulment,€or€alimony,€the€court€may€awardÏalimony€to€either€party,€and€the€existence€of€a€groundÏfor€divorce€against€the€party€requesting€alimony€shallÏnot€be€an€automatic€bar€thereto.€€However,€if€a€finalÏdisposition€has€been€made€as€to€alimony€in€anotherÏagreement,€the€provisions€of€that€agreement€shallÏcontrol. ‘Ý ƒ r°$ÝÑ @ ÑÔ€GX9XXXÔÔ€GX9XXX9ÔÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý›€The€Family€Law€Article€was€originally€enacted€by€Chapter€296Ð ° Ðof€Acts€of€1984.€€¢F.L.£€ðð€11„101€replaced€Md.€Ann.€Code€(1957€Code,Ï1981€Repl.€Vol.),€Art.€16,€ðð€1(a).€€That€section€provided,€in€part:€ÏÌà8  àò òðð€1.€€Award€when€divorce,€annulment€or€alimony€granted.ó óÐÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(a)€òòAwardóó.€ð"ð€In€granting€a€limited€or€absoluteÐ ˜è Ðdivorce,€annulment,€or€alimony,€the€court€may€awardÏalimony€to€either€party,€and€the€existence€of€a€groundÏfor€divorce€against€the€party€requesting€alimony€shallÏnot€be€an€automatic€bar€thereto.€€However,€if€a€finalÏdisposition€has€been€made€as€to€alimony€in€anotherÏagreement,€the€provisions€of€that€agreement€shallÏcontrol.´¤ìl9Z+&Courier RegularÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý›ñþ¢ñÒÀ°Òñþ¢ñÑ  Ññþ¢ñò òñþ¢ñÓ  ÓÔ‡X¾‘XXXÔñþ¢ñó óñþ¢ñÔ#†XäSXXX¾‘Z#Ôñþ¢ñÔ‡Xž¯XXXÄsÔÔ#†XÄsXXXž¯#Ôñþ¢ññõ¢ñÐ  °¤ Ðñõ¢ñÓNÓÔ_Ôñõ¢ñÑ  Ññõ¢ñÑ€Ññþ¢ñÒ°Òñþ¢ñÒX°ÒØØÓ  ÓÑ8€¾‘XXdÈdì8ÑÓÓÓÓÔ€X¾‘XXXäSÔÑ€DP¨ÑÌÌREPORTEDÌÌÌòòIN€THE€COURT€OF€SPECIAL€APPEALSÐ ˜è ÐÌOF€MARYLANDóóÐ ( x ÐÌNo.€55ÌÌSEPTEMBER€TERM,€2000ÌÌ___________________________________ÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÓØÓGARY€W.€LANGSTONÌÌÌv.ÌÌÌLORI€K.€LANGSTONÌÓÓ€ÌÌ___________________________________ÌÌà  àHollander,ÌÓ ÓÓ  Óà  àÔ_Ô¢Thieme£Ô_Ô,*Ìà0  àÔ_Ô¢Krauser£Ô_Ô,Ð €%€% Ðò òÌà  àó óà p àà È àà  àJJ.à x àÐ Ø(  ÐÓÓÌ___________________________________ÌÌÌà@€€0 àOpinion€by€Hollander,€J.ˆÌÌ___________________________________ÌÌÌÓ  ÓFiled:€ñý¢ñDecember€29,€2000ñý¢ñÌÌ*¢Thieme£,€J.€participated€in€the€hearingÏand€conference€of€this€case€while€anÏactive€member€of€this€Court;€heÏparticipated€in€the€adoption€of€thisÏopinion€as€a€retired,€specially€assignedÏmember€of€this€Court.ÌÌÌÐ x-È(4  ÐÑDP¨Ñâ DâÑ  Ñâ DâÑ  ÑÔ_ÔÒ°ÀÒÒ°XÒÑ  ÑÓëÓà  àThis€alimony€modification€dispute€arises€from€an€in€bancÏreview€conducted€by€a€three„judge€panel€of€the€Circuit€Court€forÏMontgomery€County,€pursuant€to€Maryland€Rule€2„551,€reversing€theÏcircuit€court.€€The€panel€majority€concluded€that€the€separationÏagreement€executed€by€Gary€W.€Langston,€M.D.,€appellant,€and€LoriÏK.€Langston,€appellee,€did€not€authorize€appellant€unilaterally€toÏreduce€his€alimony€payments€because€of€his€decline€in€income,€norÏdid€it€permit€retroactive€modification€of€appellantððs€alimonyÏobligation€to€a€date€preceding€his€filing€of€a€petition€requestingÏmodification.€€From€the€in€banc€decision,€appellant€timely€notedÏthis€appeal.€€He€presents€one€question€for€our€review,€which€weÏhave€divided€into€two€questions€and€rephrased:ÌÝ‚-†ÿÝÝ  ÝÓÓà8  àÝ‚-†¼ ÝÚƒÚIÚ  Ú.à0` Ð Ð àÝ  ÝDoes€the€separation€agreement€permit€appellantÐ pÀ Ðunilaterally€to€modify€his€alimony€obligation,Ïwithout€a€court€order,€because€of€a€decline€inÏincome?€€Ýƒ-†¼ õ ÝۀیР` Ð ` Ð  ÐŒÝ  ÝÌÝ‚-†ÿÝÝ  Ýà8  àÝ‚-†@ ÝÚƒÚIIÚ  Ú.à0` Ð Ð àÝ  ÝDoes€the€a)€separation€agreement€or€b)€Maryland€lawÐ X¨ Ðpermit€retroactive€modification€of€an€alimonyÏobligation€to€a€date€preceding€the€filing€of€aÏpetition€for€modification?€Ýƒ-†@ g ÝۀیР` Ð ` Ð  ÐŒÝ  ÝÌÓ× Óà  àFor€the€reasons€that€follow,€we€answer€questions€I€and€II(a)Ïin€the€negative,€and€question€II(b)€in€the€affirmative.€€Therefore,Ïwe€shall€affirm€in€part,€vacate€in€part,€and€remand€for€furtherÏproceedings.ÌÓ3 ÓÌÓ¹ ÓÓ  Óò òFACTUAL€SUMMARYó óÐ H&˜!+ ÐÓæ Óà  àThe€parties€were€married€in€Montgomery€County€on€November€7,Ï1988,€and€separated€on€January€8,€1997.€€In€between,€the€couple€hadÏfour€children,€born€between€1989€and€1995.€€Following€theirÏseparation,€the€parties€executed€a€Voluntary€Separation€andÐ Ø,((3  ÐProperty€Settlement€Agreement€dated€April€1,€1997,€which€wasÏsubsequently€amended,€on€grounds€not€pertinent€here,€by€theÏAmendment€to€Voluntary€Separation€Agreement,€dated€March€30,€1998Ï(collectively,€the€ð ðAgreementðð).€€The€Agreement€was€incorporated,Ð ` ° Ðbut€not€merged,€into€the€Judgment€of€Absolute€Divorce€dated€MarchÏ30,€1998,€and€docketed€on€April€3,€1998.€Ìà  àThe€Agreement€obligates€Dr.€Langston€to€pay€alimony€for€aÏtotal€of€ten€years,€beginning€on€April€1,€1997.€€Pursuant€to€theÏterms€of€the€Agreement,€Dr.€Langston€was€supposed€to€pay€monthlyÏalimony€of€$8,000€for€a€two„year€period,€through€March€31,€1999,Ïwith€the€amount€of€alimony€decreasing€thereafter€and€terminatingÏafter€the€tenth€year.€€The€amount€of€spousal€support€was€calculatedÏbased€on€appellantððs€annual€income€of€$751,219.00€in€the€ð ðbase€yearððÐ pÀ Ðof€1996.€€If€all€of€the€alimony€payments€were€made€in€accordanceÏwith€the€original€terms€of€the€Agreement,€Dr.€Langston€would€payÏtotal€alimony€in€excess€of€$750,000€over€the€ten„year€period.€Ìà  àModification€of€alimony€is€governed€by€Section€V€of€theÏAgreement.€€Paragraph€C€of€Section€V€is€at€issue€here.€€It€states:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` àòòThe€alimony€provisions€of€this€paragraph€are€subjectÐ Ð $ Ðto€the€further€order€of€the€court€and€may€be€modified€ASÏTO€AMOUNT€ONLYóó€based€proportionally€on€any€increase€orÐ °"& Ðdecrease€in€the€Husbands€[sic]€gross€income€usingÏcalendar€year€1996€as€a€base€year.€€The€alimonyÏprovisions€with€respect€to€terminating€events€or€date€mayÏnot€be€modified€by€any€court€of€competent€jurisdiction.€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓk&Ó(Emphasis€added).à  àÐ ˆ'Ø", Ðà  àJust€one€month€after€the€partiesðð€divorce,€Dr.€LangstonððsÏattorney€advised€Ms.€Langstonððs€attorney,€by€letter€dated€May€4,Ï1998,€that€appellant€had€experienced€a€substantial€decrease€inÐ 8,ˆ'2 Ðincome€and€had€decided€to€reduce€his€alimony€payment.€€The€letterÏstated,€in€relevant€part:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` àAs€your€client€is€aware,€Dr.€Langston€has€sufferedÏa€serious€loss€in€income€as€a€result€of€his€losing€majorÏclients.€€Pursuant€to€paragraph€VC€of€the€partiesÏagreement.€[sic]€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àAs€you€can€see€from€the€enclosed€1996€Tax€return€Dr.ÏLangstonððs€gross€income€in€1996€was€$751,219.€€His€GrossÏincome€in€1997€was€$4876,393.€[sic]€€His€projected€1998ÏGross€income€from€all€sources€.€.€.€is€expected€to€beÏ$205,000.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÓÛ)ÓÓFÓÌà@ÀÀ(ìà*€*€*ˆÌÌà8  àà ` àDr.€Langston€has€provided€Mrs.€Langston€with€theÏpayment€that€he€could€make,€and€he€will€continue€to€makeÏthe€payment€of€$2,160.€€His€1998€income€is€projected€toÏbe€27%€of€his€1996€income.€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà@ÀÀ(ìà*€*€*ˆÌÌà8  àà ` àIt€is€my€hope€that€the€parties€can€agree€on€thisÏreduction€òòwithout€application€to€the€courtóó€so€thatÐ 8ˆ Ðfurther€expense€and€stress€can€be€avoided.€€Please€let€meÏknow€at€your€earliest€convenience.Óù+ÓÐ Ð Ð  Ð(Emphasis€added).à  àÐ €Ð Ðà  àMs.€Langston€did€not€respond€to€the€letter.€€Instead,€on€JuneÏ16,€1998,€she€filed€a€Motion€for€Contempt,€claiming€that€appellantÏfailed€to€pay€alimony€as€required€by€the€Agreement.€€According€toÏappellee,€she€received€only€$2663.00€in€May,€and€appellant€thusÏowed€an€additional€$5337.00€for€the€month.€Ìà  àDr.€Langston€filed€an€opposition€to€the€contempt€motion€onÏAugust€18,€1998,€claiming€that€he€had€experienced€a€substantialÏdecrease€in€income€and€lacked€the€ability€to€comply€with€hisÏalimony€obligation.€€He€explained€that€he€was€paying€33%€of€theÏnegotiated€alimony€amount,€despite€earning€only€27%€of€his€1996Ð  +p&1 Ðincome,€on€which€his€alimony€obligation€was€based.€€AppellantÏadded:€€ð ð[Dr.€Langston]€is€finalizing€a€Counter„Motion€forÐ @ ÐModification€of€Alimony€to€be€filed€in€these€proceedings.ðð€€Ð Ð  Ðà  àA€month€later,€on€September€18,€1998,€Dr.€Langston€filed€aÏCounter„Motion€for€Modification€of€Alimony.€€He€averred€that,€dueÏto€ð ða€material€change€in€circumstances,ðð€he€was€earning€only€27Ð € Ð  Ðpercent€of€his€1996€income€and€lacked€the€ability€to€make€theÏrequired€alimony€payments.€€Further,€appellant€said€that,€prior€toÏthe€proceedings,€he€had€asked€Ms.€Langston€to€ð ðagree€to€aÐ 0€  Ðmodification€of€the€alimony€award,€pursuant€to€the€terms€of€theirÏ[¢A]greement£€and€without€the€necessity€of€Court€intervention.ðð€€InÐ P  Ðhis€attached€Financial€Statement,€filed€under€oath,€Dr.€LangstonÏlisted€monthly€income€of€$11,250€and€expenses€of€$14,928,€includingÏmonthly€alimony€payments€of€$2475.€€In€her€response,€Ms.€LangstonÏasked€the€court€to€deny€Dr.€Langstonððs€request.€€She€acknowledged,Ïhowever,€that€appellant€had€contacted€her€to€request€a€modificationÏof€his€alimony€payments,€but€she€claimed€he€ð ðprovided€noÐ °  Ðdocumentation€to€support€that€request.ðð€Ð @" Ðà  àAt€the€circuit€court€hearing€on€January€29,€1999,€the€partiesÏadvised€the€trial€judge€that€they€had€reached€an€agreementÏregarding€appellantððs€prospective€alimony€obligation,€and€thereforeÏwere€proceeding€only€with€respect€to€the€dispute€concerning€ð ðtheÐ €%Ð * Ðinterpretationðð€of€the€Agreement€and€ð ðthe€issue€of€arrearages.ðð€Ð '`", ÐSpecifically,€based€on€Dr.€Langstonððs€representation€that€hisÏincome€for€1998€was€$152,699,€the€parties€agreed€that€he€would€payÏ$1697.60€in€alimony€for€February€and€March€of€1999,€and€$1273€perÐ À+'2 Ðmonth€thereafter.€€The€parties€also€agreed€that€if€Dr.€LangstonððsÏincome€changed€by€more€than€10€percent,€he€would€notify€Ms.ÏLangston€of€the€change€in€order€for€the€parties€to€make€ð ðan€upwardÐ Ð  Ðor€downward€adjustmentðð€in€alimony.€€The€adjusted€alimony€paymentÐ ` ° Ðwould€commence€at€the€time€of€notice,€and€neither€party€would€beÏrequired€ð ðto€come€to€the€court€for€an€order€of€modification.ðð€Ð € Ð  ÐTherefore,€no€evidence€was€presented€as€to€appellantððs€income.€ÏNevertheless,€the€parties€continued€to€disagree€about:€1)€whetherÏappellant€had€the€right€under€the€Agreement€to€resort€to€self€helpÏby€reducing€his€alimony€obligation€unilaterally,€without€a€courtÏœorder;›€and€2)€the€effective€date€of€any€modification€of€alimony.€Ìà  àPursuant€to€Md.€Codeò ò€ó ó(1999€Repl.€Vol.),€ðð€8„103€of€the€FamilyÐ à0 ÐLaw€Article€(ð ðÔ_Ô¢F.L.£Ô_Ôðð),€appellant€urged€the€court€to€abide€by€theÐ À Ðpartiesðð€Agreement,€which€he€said€did€not€require€appellant€toÏobtain€court€approval€for€the€alimony€reduction,€and€insteadÏallowed€appellant€unilaterally€to€decrease€his€alimony,€using€1996Ïas€ð ðthe€base€year.ðð€€If€a€court€order€were€required,€Dr.€LangstonÐ P  Ðargued€that€the€court€should€retroactively€reduce€his€alimonyÏobligation€to€a€date€prior€to€when€he€filed€his€petition€forÏmodification,€because€that€would€be€consistent€with€the€time€whenÏhis€decrease€in€income€actually€occurred€and€with€the€Agreement.€Ìà  àMs.€Langston€disagreed,€arguing€that€ðð€V.C.€of€the€AgreementÏdid€not€authorize€Dr.€Langston€ð ðto€unilaterally€reduce€the€support.ðð€Ð `'°", ÐRather,€she€claimed€that€appellant€was€required€to€obtain€reliefÏfrom€the€court€before€reducing€support,€and€that€neither€theÏAgreement€nor€Maryland€law€permitted€a€reduction€retroactive€to€aÐ ,`'2 Ðdate€prior€to€the€time€that€Dr.€Langston€filed€a€petitionÏrequesting€modification.€€Therefore,€she€sought€total€arrearages€inÏexcess€of€$20,000€for€the€period€from€May€1998€(when€appellantÏfirst€reduced€the€amount€of€alimony)€through€September€1998€(whenÏappellant€filed€a€petition€for€modification€of€alimony).€Ìà  àThe€trial€court€agreed€with€Dr.€Langstonððs€interpretation€of€Ïðð€V.C.€€The€court€stated,€in€relevant€part:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` àI€have€considered€Paragraph€V(c)€[sic]€in€theÏpartiesðð€agreement€and€I€think€it€doesnððt€specificallyÏstate€it,€but€it€is€certainly€inferred€and€I€think€commonÏsense€would€indicate€that€the€parties€would€have€theÏright€to€reach€any€agreement€they€could€reach€betweenÏthemselves€without€having€to€come€to€court€and€ask€theÏcourt€to€modify€their€agreement.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àFurther,€I€believe€that€the€meaning€of€thisÏparagraph€as€it€applies€to€the€issue€here€is€that€if€Dr.ÏLangston€is€able€to€establish€by€the€evidence€the€date€ofÏthe€decrease€in€his€gross€income,€and€it€is€the€date€ofÏthe€decrease€that€is€issued€for€modification€purposes€andÏit€is€not€affected€by€when€he€filed€with€the€court,€so€IÏwould€accept€the€argument€of€[Dr.€Langston]€on€thatÏissue.ÓØAÓÐ Ð Ð  Ðà  àAccordingly,€the€court€entered€an€order€dated€March€8,€1999,Ïruling€that€it€ð ðfinds€that€the€meaningðð€of€ðð€V.C.,€ð ðas€it€applies€toÐ °  Ðthe€issue€of€arrearages,€is€that€the€date€of€the€decrease€forÏmodification€is€not€affected€by€when€[Dr.€Langston]€filed€with€theÏcourt.ðð€€Therefore,€the€court€granted€appellantððs€motion€forÐ `"°& Ðmodification€without€assessing€any€arrearages.€€The€order€wasÏamended€on€March€23,€1999,€on€grounds€not€relevant€here.€Ìà  àMs.€Langston€subsequently€filed€a€request€for€In€Banc€Review,Ïpursuant€to€Maryland€Rule€2„551,€stating€that€ð ð[Ô_Ô¢t]he£Ô_Ô€sole€issue€inÐ  (ð#. Ðthis€case€is€whether€[Dr.€Langston]€is€entitled€to€reduce€hisÏalimony€payments€to€[Ms.€Langston]€retroactive€to€a€date€prior€toÐ À+'2 Ðhis€filing€a€Court€pleadings€[sic]€seeking€such€relief.ðð€€In€herÐ ° Ðview,€a€modification€could€only€be€made€retroactive€to€the€dateÏthat€appellant€filed€a€petition€seeking€modification.€€In€hisÏopposition,€Dr.€Langston€again€asserted€that€ðð€V.C.€of€theÏAgreement€permitted€him€to€modify€his€alimony€obligation€based€onÏhis€change€in€income,€without€having€to€seek€court€relief€to€do€so.€ÏHe€asserted€that€ð ðthe€date€of€the€modification€of€the€amount€ofÐ `  Ð[Dr.€Langstonððs]€alimony€payment€is€dictated€by€the€terms€of€theÏpartiesðð€Agreement€.€.€.€.€without€application€to€the€Court,€[so]Ïthe€modification€is€not€limited€to€the€date€of€the€filing€of€[Dr.ÏLangstonððs]€request.ððÐ P  Ðà  àAt€the€in€banc€hearing€on€November€19,€1999,€the€parties€againÏadvanced€their€respective€positions.€€To€support€her€contentionÏthat€appellant€could€not€unilaterally€modify€his€alimony€payment,ÏMs.€Langstonððs€attorney€relied€on€the€language€of€the€Agreement,Ïwhich€provided€that€alimony€was€modifiable€pursuant€to€ð ðfurtherÐ  p Ðorder€of€the€Court.ðð€€Further,€appelleeððs€lawyer€said:€ð ðWe€are€notÐ °  Ðsuggesting€that€this€[¢A]greement£€precludes€modification€.€.€.€.ÏWhat€we€are€saying€is€that€the€Court€could€not€permit€theÏretroactive€modification€of€the€alimony€prior€to€the€actual€filingÏof€a€motion€seeking€that€relief.ðð€Ð ð#@( Ðà  àAppellant€conceded€that€the€Agreement€did€not€expresslyÏprovide€for€modification€of€alimony€retroactive€to€a€date€prior€toÏfiling€a€petition€to€modify€alimony.€€Nevertheless,€Dr.€œLangston›Ïinsisted€that€the€Agreement€provided€for€a€ð ðbuilt€in€reduction€.€.Ð 0*€%0 Ð.ðð,€and€claimed€that€ð ðthere€is€no€requirement€that€either€party€comeÐ À+'2 Ðto€Court.ðð€€The€following€colloquy€between€the€in€banc€panel€andÐ ° Ðcounsel€for€Dr.€Langston€is€informative:ÌÓÓà8  àJUDGE€¢PINCUS£:€Where€is€the€language€which€says€it€isÏretroactive€prior€to€the€date€of€filing€of€the€petitionÏto€modify€the€alimony?€€Where€does€it€say€that?Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à[APPELLANTððS€COUNSEL]:€It€doesnððt€say€that,€Your€Honor.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àJUDGE€¢PINCUS£:€I€know.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à[APPELLANTððS€COUNSEL]:€But€„„€but€the€plain€meaning€ofÏthe€words€„„€you€are€saying€that€the€parties€had€to€haveÏintended€that€there€be€an€affirmative€requirement€to€doÏthat,€and€„„€and€it€doesnððt€say€it,€so€there€is€noÏrequirement€that€either€party€come€to€Court.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àIt€says€„„€it€really€„„Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àJUDGE€¢PINCUS£:€But€it€is€just€like€any€other€case,€if€theyÏwant€to€modify€it€„„Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à[APPELLANTððS€COUNSEL]:€Right.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àJUDGE€¢PINCUS£:€€„„€by€consent€they€can,€but€in€the€eventÏone€party€has€to€come€to€Court,€which€is€what€happened€inÏthis€case,€how€do€you€make€that€leap€that€it€isÏretroactive€prior€to€the€filing€of€the€petition?Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à[APPELLANTððS€COUNSEL]:€Because€there€is€a€provision,Ïthere€is€a€built€in€reduction€that€says€it€may€beÏmodified,€and€then€it€tells€everybody€ð"ð€it€tells€theÐ °  Ðparties€how€you€do€it.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àJUDGE€¢PINCUS£:€What€the€formula€is.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà@ÀÀ(ìà*€*€*ˆÌÌà8  à[APPELLANTððS€COUNSEL]:€So€to€require€him€to€come€toÏCourt,€to€file€this,€to€do€all€those€things€when€it€isÏnot€in€the€agreement€that€he€must€do€it,€and€then€say,Ð ¸$ ) Ðð ðWell,€you€canððt€have€a€reduction€till€you€do€this,€evenÐ €%Ð * Ðthough€your€agreement€says€it€„„€it€„„€it€may€beÏmodified.ððÐ'`",Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àJUDGE€¢PINCUS£:€It€may€be,€but€it€doesnððt€„„Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à[APPELLANTððS€COUNSEL]:€Right.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àJUDGE€¢PINCUS£:€€„„€say€anything€about€if€he€has€to€come€toÏCourt€that€it€is€retroactive€prior€to€the€date€of€filing.Ј,Ø'3Ð Ð  Їà@ÀÀ(ìà*€*€*ˆÌÌà8  àJUDGE€¢PINCUS£:€.€.€.€€I€fail€to€see€where€[the€Agreement]Ïsays€it€[is]€retroactive€prior€to€the€date€of€filing€ofÏthe€petition.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à[APPELLANTððS€COUNSEL]:€Why€does€it€have€to€say€that?...€ÏÐ Ð Ð  Ðà  àJUDGE€¢PINCUS£:€Because€that€is€the€law.ÌÌà8  à[APPELLANTððS€COUNSEL]:€[¢I]t£€isnððt€the€law,€Your€Honor,€asÏto€the€interpretation€of€the€contract,€and€the€fact€thatÏthis€contract€doesnððt€have€those€[words],€you€are€.€.€.€Ïrewriting€the€contract.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àJUDGE€¢PINCUS£:€No,€I€am€not.€€I€am€trying€to€read€it€as€itÏexists.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à[APPELLANTððS€COUNSEL]:€Well,€if€you€read€it€as€it€exists,Ïthere€is€no€word€anywhere€that€says€.€.€.€you€cannot€haveÏa€reduction€pursuant€to€the€formula.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓSPÓà  àJUDGE€¢PINCUS£:€It€should€have€.€.€.€been€written€that€way.Ìà  à[APPELLANTððS€COUNSEL]:€It€wasnððt€.€.€.€€€Ìà@ÀÀ(ìà*€*€*ˆÌÓÓà8  à[APPELLANTððS€COUNSEL]:€.€.€.€[¢B]ut£€I€think€that€the€factÏthat€it€is€not€in€there„€you€are€requiring€that€it€be€inÏthere,€and€you€have€a€contract€without€it€in€there,€andÏyou€may€not€like€it,€and€you€may€think€it€doesnððt€make„„¼it€is€not€a€good€procedural€thing€to€do,€but€the€fact€isÏthat€it€is€a€way€by€which€parties€can€regulate€a€majorÏdecrease€in€income€without€the€assistance€of€the€court.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà@ÀÀ(ìà*€*€*ˆÌÌà  àJUDGE€¢SCRIVNER£:€But€they€can€always€do€that€.€.€.€œ.›ÌÌà@ÀÀ(ìà*€*€*ˆÌÌà8  àJUDGE€¢SCRIVNER£:€Every€case€in€the€State€can€€.€.€.€€Ïagree€to€change€their€agreement.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àJUDGE€¢PINCUS£:€Except„„except€in€this€case€you€cannot„„theÏCourt€cannot€modify€a€termination€event.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà  à[APPELLANTððS€COUNSEL]:€Exactly.ÌÌà  àJUDGE€¢PINCUS£:€.€.€.€or.€.€.€a€date€may€not€be€modified.€.€.€Ó ]ÓÐ À+'2 Ðà  àA€divided€in€banc€panel€reversed€the€trial€courtððs€decision.ÏSpeaking€for€the€majority,€Judge€Scrivener€stated,€in€relevantÏpart:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` àMaryland€case€law€and€Maryland€statutes€governÏsupport€and€modification€of€support,€and€the€law€providesÏthat€parties€to€a€divorce€can€enter€into€agreements€as€toÏsupport€and€modification€of€support,€and€in€certain€casesÏthose€agreements€would€supersede€what€the€law€otherwiseÏprovides.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àUnless€the€parties€contract€otherwise,€the€lawÏprovides€that€support€is€modifiable.€€In€my€opinion€„„Ïthe€majority€opinion€is€that€under€the€terms€of€theseÏparties[ðð]€agreements,€the€only€part€of€the€law€that€theyÏaddress€was€to€limit€the€circumstances€under€which€aÏCourt€could€consider€a€modification€of€this€supportÏprovision,€that€circumstance€being€a€change€in€hisÏincome,€and€the€wording€is,€I€believe,€as€to€changes€inÏhis€income€only„„other€changes€and€circumstances€thatÏmight€have€occurred,€for€instance€if€she€had€Ô_Ô¢had£Ô_Ô€anÏincrease€or€a€decrease€in€income€or€a€fatal€illness€orÏany€other€number€of€things.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àThe€parties€contracted€away€any€jurisdiction€on€theÏpart€of€the€Court€to€consider€a€modification€of€thisÏsupport.€.€.€.[Ô_Ô¢I]f£Ô_Ô€one€party.€.€.€€wanted€to€extend€theÏduration€or€shorten€the€duration,€this€Court€would€notÏhave€jurisdiction€to€do€that.€€They€contracted€that€away.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àòòIf€the€parties€had€said€in€this€agreement€that€aÐ X¨ Ðchange€in€the€support€would€be€automatic,€based€onÏchanges€in€his€income,€that€would€be€one€thing,€but€thisÏagreement€does€not€say€that€changes€in€support€areÏautomatic.óóÐh!Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àIt€provides€specifically€that€it€is€subject€toÏfurther€order€of€Court€and€that€a€Court€may€modify€„„Ïthat€is€not€an€automatic€modification„„though€MarylandÏlaw€is€that€a€Court€cannot€modify€support€prior€to€theÏfiling€of€a€petition€to€do€so,€and€nothing€in€thisÏagreement€changes€that.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àIn€other€words,€they€didnððt€contract€away€thatÏprovision€of€the€law€by€making€it€automatic€based€onÏcertain€things.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àòòSo€it€is€the€opinion€of€the€majority€that€the€CourtÐ '`"+ Ðdid€not€have€the€jurisdiction€to€modify€the€amount€ofÏsupport€prior€to€the€filing€of€a€petition€requesting€theÏCourt€to€do€so.óóÐà)0%.Ð Ð  ÐÓƒaÓÓÓà  àÌÓ3kÓ(Emphasis€added).à  àÐ ˜+è&0 Ðà  àThus,€the€in€banc€review€panel€upheld€the€modification€ofÔ% € ÔÏappellantððs€alimony€obligation,€but€determined€that€theÏmodification€was€only€œretroactive›€to€the€date€appellant€filed€hisÏpetition€to€reduce€alimony,€and€not€to€an€earlier€date€when€heÏsuffered€a€decline€in€income.€€Therefore,€by€order€dated€JanuaryÏ28,€2000,€the€court€ordered€Dr.€Langston€to€pay€alimony€arrearagesÏin€the€amount€of€$29,200.00€for€the€period€May€1998€throughÏSeptember€1998.€€Óê4ÓÌÌà  àWe€shall€include€additional€facts€in€our€discussion.ÌÓ|mÓÌÓ  Óò òDISCUSSIONÐ ˆØ ÐI.ó óÐ h¸ ÐÓìmÓà  àWe€begin€with€a€review€of€the€procedural€posture€of€this€case,Ïin€order€to€clarify€the€applicable€standard€of€our€review€and€theÏstandard€of€review€that€governed€the€in€banc€panel.€€Ìà  àUpon€motion€made€within€ten€days€of€entry€of€judgment,ÏMaryland€Rule€2„551€provides€for€in€banc€review,€as€guaranteed€byÏArticle€IV,€ðð€22€of€the€Maryland€Constitution.€€An€in€banc€courtÏacts€as€an€appellate€tribunal€with€respect€to€the€circuit€court.€Ð ¨ ø# ÐòòSee€Bd.€Of€License€¢Commððrs£€for€¢Montogmery£€County€v.€¢Haberlin£óó,€320Ð 8"ˆ% ÐMd.€399,€406€(1990);€òò¢Estep£€v.€¢Estep£óó,€285€Md.€416,€421€(1979);€òò¢Azar£Ð $h' Ðv.€Adamsóó,€117€Md.€App.€426,€434€(1997),€€òòcert.€deniedóó,€348€Md.€332Ð ø%H!) Ð(1998);€òòGreen€v.€Stateóó,€96€Md.€App.€601,€606,€òòcert.€deniedóó,€332€Md.Ð Ø'(#+ Ð702€(1993).€€Thus,€its€function€is€to€review€the€findings€andÏrulings€of€the€trial€judge.€òò€¢Dabrowski£€v.€¢Dondalski£óó,€320€Md.€392,Ð H+˜&/ Ð395„96€(1990)€(per€¢curiam£);€òòsee€¢Haberlin£óó,€320€Md.€at€407;€òò¢Estep£óó,Ð ° Ð285€Md.€at€420„421.€€Ìà  àIn€òò¢Dabrowski£óó,€320€Md.€at€395,€the€Court€recognized€that€ð ðtheÐ  p Ðdecision€of€the€court€in€banc€[is]€a€final€order€appealable€to€theÏCourt€of€Special€Appeals€under€Maryland€Code€(1974,€1989€Repl.ÏVol.),€ðð€12„301€of€the€Courts€and€Judicial€Proceedings€Article€andÏArt.€IV,€ðð€22,€of€the€Maryland€Constitution.ðð€€As€the€Court€inÐ °  Ðòò¢Estep£óó€explained:€ð ð[¢T]he£€court€in€banc€acts€only€as€an€appellateÐ @  Ðtribunal€so€that€its€decisions€are€not€those€of€a€reconsideringÏtrial€court€but€are€¢reviewable£€as€final€appellate€judgments.ðð€Ð ° Ðòò¢Estep£óó,€285€Md.€at€421;€òòsee€Montgomery€County€v.€¢McNeece£óó,€311€Md.Ð @ Ð194,€200€(1987);€òòDean€v.€Stateóó,€302€Md.€493,€397€(1985)Ð  p Ð(recognizing€that€there€is€no€ð ðdifferent€standard€of€¢appealability£Ð P Ðto€a€court€in€banc€from€that€to€the€Court€of€Special€Appeals.ðð).€Ð à ÐNevertheless,€under€Md.€Rule€2„551(h),€ð ðany€party€who€seeks€andÐ  p Ðobtains€[in€banc]€review€under€this€Rule€has€no€further€right€ofÏappeal.ðð€€This€means€that€the€decision€of€an€in€banc€panel€may€notÐ @  Ðbe€appealed€by€the€party€who€sought€in€banc€review.€Ìà  àIn€their€briefs,€neither€side€addressed€the€standard€of€reviewÏthat€applies€here,€or€that€governed€the€in€banc€review€panel.€€ForÏexample,€the€parties€have€not€discussed€whether€the€in€banc€panel,Ïgiven€its€appellate€role,€was€bound€by€the€rules€and€practices€thatÏgenerally€govern€appellate€review,€requiring€it€to€uphold€factualÏfindings€of€the€circuit€court€that€are€not€clearly€erroneous,€andÏto€uphold€the€trial€judgeððs€discretionary€decisions€in€the€absenceÐ À+'0 Ðof€abuse€of€discretion.€€Nor€have€the€parties€attempted€toÏelucidate€for€us€whether€we€must€review€the€record€and€decision€ofÏthe€in€banc€court,€the€trial€court,€or€both.€€In€response€to€ourÏinquiry€at€oral€argument,€appellantððs€counsel€merely€urged€us€toÏreview€the€trial€judgeððs€decision,€while€appelleeððs€lawyerÏcounseled€us€to€review€the€in€banc€panelððs€decision.€€Ìà  àWe€look€to€òò¢Azar£,óó€117€Md.€App.€426,€for€guidance.€€There,€weÐ `  Ðconsidered,€òòinter€aliaóó,€the€ð ðscopeðð€of€our€review€of€an€in€bancÐ ð@  Ðcourtððs€decision.€€òòId.€óó€at€433.€€The€òò¢Azar£óó€Court€sought€to€resolveÐ Ð  Ðwhether€the€Court€reviews€only€the€action€of€the€in€banc€court€onÏthe€record€before€it,€or€the€findings€of€the€trial€court€on€itsÏrecord,€or€both.€€Writing€for€the€Court,€Judge€¢Cathell£€thoughtfullyÏanalyzed€the€in€banc€process,€but€acknowledged€that€he€found€noÏcases€ð ðdelineating€or€limiting€the€scope€of€our€reviewðð€of€an€inÐ ð@ Ðbanc€proceeding.€€òòId.óó€at€432.€€In€analyzing€Rule€2„551(h),€the€òò¢Azar£óóÐ €Ð ÐCourt€observed,€117€Md.€App.€at€433:Ó'tÓÌÌà8  àà ` àThis€rule€does€not€resolve€the€quandary,€i.e.,€areÏwe,€when€reviewing€a€decision€of€an€òòin€bancóó€court,Ð ¸! Ðlimited€to€the€record€presented€to€the€òòin€bancóó€court,€orÐ ¨ ø" Ðmay€we€consider€the€transcripts,€pleadings,€and€evidenceÏfrom€the€trial€court€proceedings.€We€have€found€no€ruleÏgoverning€the€scope€of€our€review€of€an€òòin€bancóó€court'sÐ (#x% Ðaction.€An€òòin€bancóó€court€is,€however,€an€appellateÐ $h& Ðtribunal.€It€is€subordinate€to€this€Court€just€as€we€areÏsubordinate€to€the€Court€of€Appeals.€When€the€appellateÏprocess€commences€via€the€òòin€bancóó€court€route,€that€courtÐ ˜&è!) Ðis,€as€to€this€Court,€in€the€case€where€an€appellee€atÏthe€òòin€bancóó€level€files€a€further€appeal,€an€intermediateÐ P( #+ Ðappellate€court.€That€fact,€however,€also€offers€littleÏhelp€in€resolving€what€it€is€that€we€are€reviewing€andÏwhat€constitutes€the€record€upon€which€our€review€is€toÏbe€based.€The€issue€is€whether€our€review€is€limited€toÏthe€record€before€the€òòin€bancóó€panel€or€whether€we€mayÐ `,°'0 Ðreview€the€entire€record€of€the€trial€court€proceedings.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓn~Óà  àIn€regard€to€the€standard€of€review€applicable€to€the€in€bancÏcourtððs€consideration€of€the€trial€courtððs€rulings,€Judge€¢Cathell£Ïexplained:€€ÓrnÓÌÌà8  àà ` àð ðAn€appeal€to€an€òòin€bancóó€panel€is€an€alternativeÐ ð @ Ðavenue€of€appellate€review.€The€forum€may€be€different,Ïbut€the€restraints€upon€the€process€are€the€same.€ÏNeither€the€òòin€bancóó€panel€nor€we€may€relevantly€askÐ p À  Ðwhether€we€would€have€reached€the€same€decision€as€thatÏreached€by€the€circuit€court.€Neither€it€nor€we€have€anyÏindependent€or€òòde€novoóó€fact-finding€responsibility€orÐ ð@  Ðprerogative.€As€to€fact€finding,€we€should€both€beÏconcerned€only€with€whether€[the€trial€judge]€was€legallyÏin€error.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓ„ÓòòId.óó€at€434€(quoting€òòGeneral€Motors€Corp.€v.€Barkóó,€79€Md.€App.€68,Ð P Ð70„71€(1989).Ìà  àFortunately€for€the€òò¢Azar£óó€Courtòò,óó€it€did€not€have€to€resolve€theÐ pÀ Ðð ðquandaryðð€that€it€identified.€€It€said,€at€117€Md.€App.€at€434„35:ÓÙxÓÐ P  ÐÌà8  àà ` àThankfully,€we€need€not€now€resolve€that€difficultÏquestion€[of€what€this€Court€must€review€in€an€appealÏfrom€an€in€banc€panel].€We€perceive€that€if€we€areÏreviewing€the€decision€of€the€òòin€bancóó€court€on€either€theÐ 8ˆ Ðevidence€before€it€or€the€evidence€as€supplemented€byÏadditional€portions€of€the€trial€court€record€€presentedÏto€us,€its€decision€was€appropriate.€Alternatively,€basedÏupon€the€portions€of€the€trial€court€record€presented€inÏthe€extract,€if€we€are€merely€repeating€an€appellateÏreview€of€the€trial€court's€action,€we€hold€that€itÏerred....Ð Ð Ð  Ѐ€€ÌÓȇÓà  àWe€conclude€from€òò¢Azar£óó,€and€the€cases€on€which€it€relied,€thatÐ h$¸' Ðthe€in€banc€panel€functions€like€an€intermediate€appellate€court.€ÏThis€means€that€it€must€review€the€circuitððs€factual€findings€andÏdiscretionary€rulings.€€But,€it€may€not€set€aside€factual€findingsÏof€the€trial€court€unless€clearly€erroneous,€nor€disturb€the€trialÏjudgeððs€discretionary€rulings€absent€a€finding€of€abuse€ofÐ ˆ,Ø'1 Ðdiscretion.€€The€in€banc€panel€does€not€make€òòde€novoóó€factualÐ ° Ðfindings,€however.€€Moreover,€like€any€appellate€court,€the€in€bancÏpanel€does€not€defer€to€the€circuit€court€with€respect€to€questionsÏof€law,€just€as€we€do€not€defer€to€a€lower€tribunalððs€resolution€ofÏa€legal€question.€€Ìà  àWe€also€rely€on€òò¢Azar£óó€to€explain€our€role.€€If€the€in€bancÐ Ð   Ðpanel€functions€like€an€intermediate€appellate€court,€then€our€roleÏis€akin€to€the€Court€of€Appeals,€in€the€sense€that€we€provide€anÏadditional€level€of€appellate€review.€€We€reason€by€analogy€toÏthose€cases€that€are€tried€in€the€circuit€court€and€then€reviewedÏby€this€Court€and€later€by€the€Court€of€Appeals.€€When€issues€areÏraised€on€appeal€concerning€a€trial€courtððs€factual€findings,€whichÏare€first€considered€by€this€Court€€and€then€by€the€Court€ofÏAppeals,€the€Court€of€Appeals€essentially€reviews€our€review€of€theÏfactual€findings€made€by€the€circuit€court€as€the€originalÏtribunal.€€(Peeling€the€layers€of€an€onion€seems€like€an€aptÏdescription€hereñö¢ñ.ñö¢ñ)ñ÷¢ñ.ñ÷¢ñ€€In€the€process,€the€Court€of€Appeals€must€alsoÏexamine€the€trial€courtððs€decision.€€Similarly,€in€our€review€ofÏthe€in€banc€panelððs€opinion€addressing€an€issue€about€the€factualÏfindings€of€the€circuit€judge,€we€ñø¢ñmust€ñø¢ñassess€the€correctness€of€the€inÏbanc€panelððs€œrulingñú¢ñ,€ñú¢ññü¢ññû¢ñDecember€21,ñû¢ññü¢ññû¢ññû¢ññü¢ññû¢ñ€2000ñû¢ññü¢ññù¢ñbut€we€can€only€do€soñù¢ñ›€by€analyzing€the€factual€findings€of€theÏcircuit€judge€in€light€of€the€record.€€In€the€same€way,€when€anÏappeal€from€an€in€banc€panel€concerns€an€issue€regarding€aÏdiscretionary€ruling€of€the€trial€judge,€we€must€consider€the€inÏbanc€panelððs€review€of€the€trial€judgeððs€discretionary€ruling.€ÏBut,€this€necessarily€requires€us€to€consider€the€trial€judgeððsÐ `,°'2 Ðexercise€of€discretion,€for€we€must€be€€satisfied€that€the€trialÏcourt€properly€exercised€its€discretionÏand€did€not€abuse€its€discretion.€Ìà  àIn€the€case€òòsub€judiceóó,€we€are€not€required€to€determineÐ €%Ð * Ðwhether€any€factual€findings€were€clearly€erroneous.€€That€isÏbecause€the€material€facts€that€were€presented€were€not€in€dispute.€ÏOn€the€other€hand,€as€our€discussion,€òòinfraóó,€indicates,€we€are€notÐ 0*€%0 Ðsatisfied€that€all€material€facts€were€presented.€€Nor€are€weÐ À+'2 Ðcalled€upon€to€determine€if€the€circuit€judge€properly€exercisedÏhis€discretion.€€That€is€because€he€did€not€exercise€hisÏdiscretion.€€But,€as€we€discuss,€òòinfraóó,€we€believe€the€caseÐ Ð  Ðultimately€turns€on€the€exercise€of€discretion.€€Ìà  àIn€any€event,€we€are€satisfied€that€the€in€banc€panelÏcorrectly€construed€the€Agreement€with€respect€to€appellantððsÏcontention€that€the€Agreement€authorized€him€to€modify€unilaterallyÏhis€alimony€obligation;€we€agree€with€the€in€banc€panel€that€theÏAgreement€does€not€permit€Dr.€Langston€to€reduce€his€alimonyÏobligation€without€a€court€order.€€We€also€concur€with€the€in€bancÏpanel€that€the€terms€of€the€Agreement€do€not€permit€modification€ofÏalimony€retroactive€to€a€date€preceding€the€filing€of€a€request.ÏTherefore,€we€reject€the€trial€judgeððs€conclusion€to€the€contrary.ÏTo€be€sure,€the€parties€could€have€included€such€terms€in€theirÏAgreement,€but€they€failed€to€do€so.€€€Ìà  àWe€disagree,€however,€with€the€in€banc€panelððs€conclusion€thatÏMaryland€statutory€law€bars€modification€of€alimony€retroactive€toÏa€date€preceding€the€filing€of€a€request.€€Although€that€view€seemsÏto€be€the€general€perception€among€lawyers€and€the€bench,€weÏbelieve€that€Maryland€law€makes€such€a€determination€a€matter€forÏthe€trial€court€in€the€exercise€of€its€discretion.€€Because€theÏtrial€judge€failed€to€exercise€that€discretion,€we€shall€remand€forÏfurther€proceedings,€in€order€to€permit€the€trial€court€toÏestablish€the€effective€date€for€modification€of€appellantððsÏalimony.€€We€explain.€€Ìñð¢ñÐ À+'2 Ðñð¢ñà@ÀÀ(ìàò òII.ó 󀀈Ð ° Ðà  àThe€primary€source€of€discord€concerns€ðð€¢V.C£€of€the€Agreement.€ÏAs€we€noted,€appellant€maintains€that€the€terms€of€this€provisionÏdid€not€require€him€to€obtain€the€courtððs€permission€beforeÏreducing€his€alimony€payment€due€to€his€change€in€financialÏcircumstances.€€Appellant€asserts:ÌÓÓà8  àThe€parties€.€.€.€agreed€.€.€.€that€[they]€may€themselvesÏmodify€the€amount€of€alimony€based€proportionally€on€anyÏincrease€or€decrease€in€the€Husbandððs€gross€income€usingÏcalendar€year€1996€as€a€base€year.€€There€is€nothing€inÏthe€partiesðð€Agreement€that€requires€either€party€toÏapply€to€the€court€for€permission€prior€to€making€theÏcontemplated€recalculation€and€modification.€€If€it€wasÏthe€partiesðð€intention€that€one€of€them€must€make€requestÏto€the€Court,€that€term€would€have€been€included€in€theirÏAgreement.ÓE¡ÓÐ Ð Ð  Ðà  àMs.€Langston€argues€that€the€Agreement€did€not€permitÏappellant€to€bypass€the€court€and€decide€for€himself€that€heÏqualified€for€a€reduction€in€alimony.€€Further,€appellee€maintainsÏthat€neither€the€Agreement€nor€applicable€Maryland€law€entitledÏappellant€to€modification€of€alimony€retroactive€to€a€dateÏpreceding€his€petition€requesting€modification.€€Thus,€she€claimsÏthat€the€in€bancòò€óópanel€properly€construed€ðð€V.C.€of€the€AgreementÐ  \# Ðwhen€it€determined€that€Dr.€Langston€owes€arrearages€for€the€periodÏfrom€May€to€September€1998.€Ìà  àThe€Agreement€was€incorporated€but€not€merged€into€the€divorceÏdecree.€€The€provisions€of€a€separation€agreement€that€areÏincorporated€but€not€merged€into€a€divorce€decree€may€be€enforcedÏas€an€independent€contract.€€òòSchneider€v.€Schneideróó,€335€Md.€500,Ð l)¼$/ Ð516€(1994);€òòseeóó€¢F.L.£€ðð€8-105(a)(2);€sòòee€alsoóó€John€F.€¢Fader£,€et€al.,Ð ü*L&1 ÐòòMaryland€Family€Lawóó€ðð€13„8,€at€586€(2nd€ed.€1995).€€Thus,€theÐ ° ÐAgreement€is€subject€to€the€same€general€rules€of€constructionÏapplicable€to€other€contracts.€€òòBruce€v.€Dyeróó,òò€óó309€Md.€421,€433Ð Ð  Ð(1987);€òòGoldberg€v.€Goldbergóó,€290€Md.€204,€212€(1981);òò€¢Fultz£€v.Ð ` ° ТShaffer£óó,€111€Md.€App.€278,€298€(1996).€òòÐ ð @ Ðóóà  àA€fundamental€principle€of€contract€construction€requires€thatÐ € Ð  Ðwe€give€effect€to€the€intention€of€the€contracting€parties,€unlessÏthat€intention€is€at€odds€with€an€established€principle€of€law.€ÏòòHartford€Accident€&€¢Indem£.€Co.€v.€¢Scarlett£€Harbor€¢Assocs£.€Ltd.Ð 0€  ТPððship£óó,€109€Md.€App.€217,€290„91€(1996),€òò¢affððd£óó,€346€Md.€122€(1997).€Ð À ÐMoreover,€ð ðthe€primary€source€for€determining€the€intention€of€theÐ P  Ðparties€is€the€language€of€the€contract€itself.ðð€òò€Hartford€AccidentÐ à0 Ð&€¢Indem£.óó,€109€Md.€App.€at€290„91€(citations€omitted).€€ContractsÐ pÀ Ðare€construed€ð ðas€a€whole€to€determine€the€partiesðð€intentions.ðð€Ð P Ðòò¢Sullins£€v.€Allstate€Ins.€Co.óó,€340€Md.€503,€508€(1995).€Ð à ÐAdditionally,€we€construe€words€in€a€contract€consistent€with€theirÏusual€and€ordinary€meaning,€unless€it€is€apparent€that€the€partiesÏascribed€a€special€or€technical€meaning€to€the€words.€€òòId.óó;€òòseeÐ @" ÐCheneyóó€òòv.€Bell€¢Natððl£€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€315€Md.€761,€766€(1989).Ð Ð $ Ðà  àContracts€are,€however,€subject€to€the€law€of€objectiveÏinterpretation.€€òòSee€Auction€&€Estate€Representatives,€Inc.€v.Ð ð#@( ÐAshtonóó,€354€Md.€333,€340€(1999);€òò¢Calomiris£€v.€Woodsóó,€353€Md.€425,Ð €%Ð * Ð435€(1999);€òò¢Adloo£€v.€H.T.€Brown€Real€Estate,€Inc.óó,€344€Md.€254,€266Ð '`", Ð(1996).€€This€means€that€the€clear€and€unambiguous€language€of€aÏwritten€agreement€controls,€even€when€the€language€is€not€congruentÏwith€the€partiesðð€actual€intent€at€the€time€of€the€creation€of€theÐ À+'2 Ðcontract.€òò€Ashtonóó,€354€Md.€at€340;òò€Bruce€v.€Dyeróó,€òòsupraóó,€309€Md.Ð ° Ð421,€433;€òò¢Kasten£€Constr.€Co.,€Inc.€v.€Rod€¢Ent£.,€Inc.óó,€268€Md.€318,Ð @ Ð328€(1973))(stating€that€ð ðwhere€a€contract€is€plain€andÐ Ð  Ðunambiguous,€there€is€no€room€for€construction,€and€it€must€beÏpresumed€that€the€parties€meant€what€they€expressed.ðð);òò€NicholsonÐ ð @ ÐAir€¢Servs£.,€Inc.€v.€Board€of€County€¢Commððrs£óó,€120€Md.€App.€47,€63Ð € Ð  Ð(1997);€òòBaltimore€Gas€&€Elec.€Co.€v.€Commercial€Union€Ins.€Co.óó,€113Ð `  ÐMd.€App.€540,€554€(1998).€€It€follows€that€the€true€test€of€what€isÏmeant€is€not€what€the€parties€to€the€contract€intended€it€to€mean,Ïbut€what€a€reasonable€person€in€the€position€of€the€parties€wouldÏhave€thought€the€agreement€meant.€€òò¢Calomiris£óó,€òòsupraóó,€353€Md.€atÐ P  Ð436;€òòsee€¢Feick£€v.€¢Thrutchley£óó,€322€Md.€111,€115€(1991);€see€alsoÐ à0 ÐòòGeneral€Motors€Acceptance€Corp.€v.€Danielsóó,€303€Md.€254,€261Ð pÀ Ð(1985);€òòAetna€¢Cas£.€&€Sur.€Co.€v.€Ins.€¢Commððr£óó,€293€Md.€409,€420Ð P Ð(1982);€òòAnne€¢Arundel£€County€v.€Crofton€Corp.óó,€286€Md.€666,€673Ð à Ð(1980).€€The€Court€of€Appeals€explained€in€òò¢Calomiris£óó:Ð  p ÐÓÓà8  àð ðIn€these€circumstances,€the€true€test€of€what€is€meantÐ °  Ðis€not€what€the€parties€to€the€contract€intended€it€toÏmean,€but€what€a€reasonable€person€in€the€position€of€theÏparties€would€have€thought€it€meant.€€Consequently,€theÏclear€and€unambiguous€language€of€an€agreement€will€notÏgive€away€to€what€the€parties€thought€that€the€agreementÏmeant€or€intended€it€to€mean.ðð€€Ð`"°&Ð Ð  ÐÌÓUµÓòò¢Calomiris£óó,€353€Md.€at€436€(quoting€òòGeneral€Motors€Acceptance€Corp.óó,Ð ð#@( Ð303€Md.€at€261).€€€Ìà  àWhen€a€contract€is€ambiguous,€ð ðthe€meaning€of€the€contract€isÐ '`", Ða€question€to€be€determined€by€the€trier€of€fact.ðð€òòUniversity€ofÐ  (ð#. ÐBaltimore€v.€¢Iz£óó,€123€Md.€App.€135,€162,€òòcert.€deniedóó,€351€Md.€663Ð 0*€%0 Ð(1998);€òòsee€Shapiroóó€òòvóó.€òò¢Massengill£óó,€105€Md.€App.€743,€754-55,€òòcert.Ð À+'2 Ðdeniedóó,€341€Md.€28€(1995).€€Contractual€language€is€consideredÐ ° Ðambiguous€ð ðif,€when€read€by€a€reasonably€prudent€person,€it€isÐ @ Ðsusceptible€of€more€than€one€meaning.ðð€€òò¢Calomiris£óó,€353€Md.€at€436;Ð Ð  Ðòòaccordóó€òòAshtonóó,€354€Md.€at€340;€òòHeat€&€Power€Corp.óó,òò€v.€Air€Prods.€&Ð ` ° ТChems£.,€Inc.óó,€320€Md.€584,€596€(1990);€òòsee€Pacific€¢Indem£.€Co.€v.Ð ð @ ÐInterstate€Fire€&€¢Cas£.€Co.óó,€302€Md.€383,€389€(1985)(stating€thatÐ € Ð  Ðlanguage€ð ðmay€be€ambiguous€if€it€is€ððgeneralðð€and€may€suggest€twoÐ `  Ðmeanings€to€a€reasonably€prudent€laypersonðð).€€In€òò¢Calomiris£óó,€œñì¢ñòòóóñì¢ñthe›Ð  ð  ÐCourt€explained€that€ð ð[¢t]he£€determination€of€whether€language€isÐ 0€  Ðsusceptible€of€more€than€one€meaning€includes€a€consideration€ofÏððthe€character€of€the€contract,€its€purpose,€and€the€facts€andÏcircumstances€of€the€parties€at€the€time€of€execution.ðððð€353€Md.€atÐ à0 Ð436€(quoting€òòPacific€¢Indem£.óó,€302€Md.€at€388).€Ð pÀ Ðà  àOf€significance€here,€the€determination€of€contractualÏambiguity€is€a€threshold€question€of€law,€subject€to€òòde€novo€óóreviewÐ à Ðby€this€Court.€òò€Ashtonóó,€354€Md.€at€341;€òò¢Calomiris£óó,€353€Md.€at€434;Ð  p Ðòò¢JBG£/¢Twinbrook£€Metro€Ltd.€¢Pððship£€v.€Wheeleróó,€346€Md.€601,€625€(1997)Ð °  Ð(ð ðThe€interpretation€of€a€written€contract€is€ordinarily€a€questionÐ @" Ðof€law€for€the€court.ðð).€€In€deciding€whether€a€contract€isÐ Ð $ Ðambiguous,€ð ðthe€court€is€confined€to€a€review€of€the€contractÐ `"°& Ðlanguage€itself.ðð€€òò¢Iz£óó,€123€Md.€App.€at€162;€òòsee€McIntyre€v.€Guild,Ð ð#@( ÐInc.óó,€105€Md.€App.€332,€355€(1995).€€€€Ð €%Ð * Ðà  àOrdinarily,€because€we€give€ð ðlegal€effect€to€the€clear€termsÐ '`", Ðof€a€contract,ðð€the€terms€may€not€be€contradicted€by€extrinsic€orÐ  (ð#. Ðparol€evidence€of€prior€or€contemporaneous€agreements.€€òò¢Calomiris£óó,Ð 0*€%0 Ð353€Md.€at€432.€€But,€when€the€terms€of€a€contract€are€ambiguous,Ð À+'2 Ðð ðextrinsic€and€parol€evidence€may€be€considered€to€ascertain€theÐ ° Ðintention€of€the€parties.ðð€€òò¢Sullins£óó,€340€Md.€at€508;€òòseeóó€œñì¢ñòòóóòòóóñì¢ñòò›Ð @ ТCalomiris£óó,€353€Md.€at€433€(ð ðAll€courts€generally€agree€that€parolÐ Ð  Ðevidence€is€admissible€when€the€written€words€are€sufficientlyÏambiguous.ðð);€òòKendall€v.€Nationwide€Ins.€Co.óó,€348€Md.€157,€170Ð ð @ Ð(1997);€òòPacific€¢Indem£.€Co.óó,€302€Md.€at€389;€œòòSon›€v.€¢Margolius£,Ð € Ð  ТMallios£,€Davis,€Rider€&€¢Tomar£óó,€114€Md.€App.€190,€213€(1997)Ð `  Ð(ð ð[¢W]hen£€a€written€agreement€is€ambiguous,€a€court€must€resort€toÐ  ð  Ðthe€rules€of€contract€construction€and€may€also€consider€extrinsicÏevidence.ðð),€òòreversed€on€other€groundsóó,€349€Md.€441€(1998).€€Ð À Ðà  àThe€standard€of€review€that€applies€to€the€lower€court'sÏruling€on€ambiguity€differs€from€the€standard€that€governs€factualÏfindings€based€on€parol€evidence€after€the€court€has€determinedÏthat€the€contract€language€is€ambiguous.€€ð ð[¢O]n£€appeal,€òòde€novoóóÐ P Ðreview€applies€to€the€initial€determination€of€whether€contractualÏlanguage€is€ambiguous,€and€the€clearly€erroneous€standard€comesÏinto€play€only€after€the€trial€court's€finding€of€ambiguity€isÏupheld.ðð€€€òò¢Calomiris£óó,€353€Md.€at€435.€€Stated€otherwise,€if€theÐ @" Ðtrial€court€finds€that€a€contract€is€ambiguous,€and€if€we€agreeÏwith€the€trial€court's€finding€of€ambiguity,€we€will€apply€aÏclearly€erroneous€standard€to€the€trial€court's€construction€of€theÏcontract€in€light€of€the€parol€evidence€received.€Ìà  àApparently,€the€trial€court€did€not€consider€the€AgreementÏambiguous.€€The€judge€said:€ð ðI€think€common€sense€would€indicateÐ  (ð#. Ðthat€the€parties€would€have€the€right€to€reach€any€agreement€theyÏcould€reach€between€themselves€without€having€to€come€to€court€andÐ À+'2 Ðask€the€court€to€modify€their€agreement€.€.€.€[¢I]t£€is€the€date€ofÏthe€decrease€that€is€used€for€modification€purposes€and€it€is€notÏaffected€by€when€he€filed€with€the€court.ðð€€Although€the€trialÐ Ð  Ðcourt€acknowledged€that€the€Agreement€ð ðdoesnððt€specificallyðð€allowÐ ` ° Ðmodification€to€a€date€prior€to€the€filing€of€the€petition,€theÏjudge€believed€it€was€ð ðcertainly€inferred.ðð€€In€a€two€to€oneÐ € Ð  Ðdecision,€the€in€bancòò€óópanel€also€considered€the€AgreementÐ `  Ðunambiguous,€but€reached€the€opposite€conclusion€as€to€the€meaningÏof€the€contract.€Ìà  àAs€we€observed,€the€threshold€question€of€ambiguity€is€aÏquestion€of€law.€€Upon€review€of€the€Agreement,€we€agree€with€theÏin€banc€panel€that€the€Agreement€is€not€ambiguous€with€respect€toÏthe€issue€of€whether€appellant€had€the€right€to€reduce€his€alimonyÏobligation€on€his€own,€without€first€obtaining€a€court€order.€€WeÏsee€no€basis€in€the€Agreement€for€the€strained€conclusion€that€ððÏV.C.€authorized€appellant€to€decide€for€himself€whether€he€sufferedÏa€material€change€in€circumstances€sufficient€to€warrant€aÏreduction€in€alimony.€€In€reaching€that€conclusion,€we€rely€on€theÏterms€of€the€Agreement,€which€expressly€states€that€the€alimonyÏprovisions€ð ðare€subject€to€the€further€order€of€the€court€and€mayÐ `"°& Ðbe€modified€AS€TO€AMOUNT€ONLY.ðð€€That€language€plainly€indicatesÐ ð#@( Ðthat€the€parties€contemplated€court€approval€for€a€change€in€theÏòòamountóó€of€alimony.€Ð '`", Ðà  àAs€we€indicated,€we€are€also€equally€satisfied€that€the€inÏbanc€panel€correctly€concluded€that€the€language€of€the€AgreementÏdoes€not€provide€for€modification€of€alimony€retroactive€to€theÐ À+'2 Ðdate€when€appellant€first€sustained€a€decrease€in€income.€€In€thisÏregard,€we€observe€that€the€Agreement€does€not€make€any€mentionÏwhatsoever€authorizing€such€modification.€€The€reference€in€ðð€V.C.Ïto€1996€as€the€ð ðbase€yearðð€for€purposes€of€determining€theÐ ` ° Ðproportional€increase€or€decrease€in€alimony€does€not€mean€that€theÏparties€agreed€that€every€modification€would€automatically€beÏretroactive€to€1996.€€If€that€were€the€case,€the€Agreement€would€beÏno€agreement€at€all.€€In€effect,€it€could€be€rescinded€long€afterÏit€became€effective.€€€€€Ìà  àAppellant€relies€on€òòShapiro€v.€Shapiroóó,€346€Md.€648€(1997),€toÐ À Ðsupport€his€contentions.€€There,€the€Court€considered€¢F.L.£€ðð€8„¼103(c)€and€determined€that€the€General€Assembly€did€not€intend€ð ðtoÐ à0 Ðprevent€parties,€by€contract,€from€excepting€themselves€underÏspecified€conditions,€as€opposed€to€universally,€fromÏ¢modifiability£.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€658.€€Appellantððs€reliance€on€òòShapiroóó€isÐ à Ðmisplaced.€€The€issue€here€is€not€whether€the€parties€had€the€rightÏto€make€a€contract€that€linked€alimony€modification€to€the€date€ofÏa€decline€in€income.€€òòSeeóó€¢F.L.£€ðð€11„101(c).€€The€question€isÐ @" Ðwhether€they€did€so.€ñò¢ñÌñò¢ñÌà@üü(ìàò òIII.ó óˆÐ ð#@( Ðà  àAlthough€we€have€established€that€the€terms€of€the€AgreementÏdo€not€sanction€unilateral€modification€by€appellant€of€his€alimonyÏobligation,€or€modification€retroactive€to€1996€or€some€other€dateÏprior€to€the€filing€of€a€request,€those€determinations€do€notÏresolve€the€matter€entirely.€€The€absence€of€a€contract€clauseÐ À+'2 Ðexpressly€permitting€reduction€of€alimony€retroactive€to€a€dateÏprior€to€the€filing€of€a€request€is€not€¢dispositive£,€because€theÏquestion€remains€as€to€whether€the€court€had€the€discretion,€underÏMaryland€law,€to€modify€alimony€retroactive€to€a€date€whenÏappellantððs€income€first€decreased,€even€if€that€date€preceded€theÏfiling€of€a€formal€modification€request.€€We€think€that€it€did.€€Ìà  àAt€oral€argument,€appellee€relied€on€¢F.L.£€ðð€11„101€for€theÏproposition€that,€absent€an€agreement€between€the€parties,€theÏcourt€may€not€retroactively€modify€alimony€to€a€date€prior€to€aÏrequest€submitted€to€the€court.€€Although€that€is€the€general€viewÏamong€the€bench€and€bar,€we€have€not€found€any€statutory€basis€orÏdecisional€law€to€support€that€perception.€€Ìà  àTitle€11€of€the€Family€Law€Article€governs€alimony.€€¢F.L.£€ððÏ11„101€concerns€an€initial€award€of€alimony€and€states,€in€part:¢ñí¢ñ׃E×ñí¢ññí¢ñ׃F×ñí¢ñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×£€Ð P ÐÓÓà8  àò òðð€11„101.€€Award€ð"ð€In€general.ó óÐàÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  à€(a)€òòWhere€available.óó€ð"ð€The€court€may€award€alimony:Ð pÐ Ð  Ðà8  à€€€(1)€on€a€bill€of€complaint€for€alimony;€orÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  à€€€(2)€as€a€part€of€a€decree€that€grants:Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(¢i£)€à0¸ Ð Ð à€an€annulment;ÐxÈ!¸ Ð ¸ Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(ii)€€a€limited€divorce;€orÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(iii)€an€absolute€divorce.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÐ Ð $ Ðà@ÀÀ(ìà*€*€*ˆÌÌà8  à€(c)€òòEffect€of€agreement.óó€ð"ð€If€a€final€disposition€as€toÐ @ Ðalimony€has€been€made€in€an€agreement€between€theÏparties,€the€court€is€bound€by€that€agreement€as€theÏagreement€relates€to€alimony.€€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÜÓThus,€under€¢F.L.£€ðð€11„101(c),€the€court€is€ð ðboundðð€by€the€terms€ofÐ ( x Ðany€agreement€between€the€parties€with€respect€to€alimony.€€Here,Ïas€we€have€seen,€the€Agreement€does€not€speak€to€retroactivity.€€Ìà  à¢F.L.£€ðð€11„106€is€also€relevant.€€Effective€October€1,€1984,€itÏwas€added€to€the€Family€Law€Article,€pursuant€to€Chapter€213€ofÏActs€of€Maryland€(1984).€€¢F.L.£€ðð€11„106€says,€in€part:€ÌÓÓà8  àò òðð€11„106.€€Same€„€Determination€of€amount€and€duration.ó óЈØÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à(a)à ¸ àòòCourt€to€make€determinationóó.€ð"ð€(1)€The€CourtÐ h Ðshall€determine€the€amount€of€and€the€period€for€an€awardÏof€alimony.€€Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à€€€(2)€òòThe€court€may€award€alimony€for€a€periodÐ pÀ Ðbeginning€from€the€filing€of€a€pleading€that€requestsÏalimony.óóÓuáÓÐPÐ Ð  Ð(Emphasis€added).€€Thus,€with€respect€to€an€initial€alimony€award,Ïit€is€clear,€by€statute,€that€the€date€of€the€filing€of€a€requestÏis€critical.€€Ìà  àModification€of€alimony,€however,€is€governed€by€otherÏportions€of€the€Family€Law€Article.€€¢F.L.£€ðð€11„107€is€relevant.€€ItÏstates,€in€part:ÌÓÓà  àÔ_Ôò òÔ_Ôðð€11„107.€Extension€of€period;€modification€of€amount.ó ó€Ð ð#@( Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àÌà@ÀÀ(ìà*€*€*ˆÌÌà8  à(b)€€Modification€of€amount.€„€Subject€to€ðð€8„103€of€thisÏarticle€and€on€the€petition€of€either€party,€òòthe€courtÐ Ú'*#- Ðmay€modify€the€amount€of€alimony€awarded€as€circumstancesÏand€justice€requireóó.Ðj)º$/Ð Ð  ÐÌ(Emphasis€added).ÌÐ Â+'2 Ðà  à¢F.L.£€ðð€8„103€is€also€pertinent.€€It€provides:ÌÌà  àò òðð€8„103.€€Modification€of€deed,€agreement,€or€settlement.Ð @ ÐÌà@ÀÀ(ìàó ó*€*€*ˆÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  à(b)€òòException€for€provision€concerning€support€of€aÐ ` ° Ðspouseóó.„€The€court€may€modify€any€provision€of€a€deed,Ð ( x Ðagreement€or€settlement€with€respect€to€spousal€supportÏexecuted€on€or€after€January€1,€1976,€regardless€of€howÏthe€provision€is€stated,€òòunless€there€is€a€provision€thatÐ € Ð  Ðspecifically€states€that€the€provisions€with€respect€toÏspousal€support€are€not€subject€to€any€courtÏmodificationóó.ÐØ( Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à(c)€òòCertain€exceptions€for€provision€concerning€alimonyÐ h¸  Ðor€support€of€spouse.óó„€The€court€may€modify€any€provisionÐ 0€  Ðof€a€deed,€agreement,€or€settlement€with€respect€toÏalimony€or€spousal€support€executed€on€or€after€April€13,Ï1976,€regardless€of€how€the€provision€is€stated,€unlessÏthere€is:Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àà ` à(1)€an€express€waiver€of€alimony€or€spousal€support;€orÌÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(2)€a€provision€that€specifically€states€thatÏthe€provisions€with€respect€to€alimony€orÏspousal€support€are€not€subject€to€any€courtÏmodification.Ð ` x` x ÐÌ(Emphasis€added).ÌÌà  àIn€addition,€we€must€consider€¢F.L.£€ðð€8„105.€€It€says:ÌÌà  àò òððó ó€ò ò8„105.€€Power€of€court€to€enforce€or€modify€provisions.ó óÐ xÈ! ÐÌà@ÀÀ(ìà*€*€*ˆÌÌà8  à(b)€òòModification€óó„€The€court€may€modify€any€provision€ofÐ š!ê% Ða€deed,€agreement,€or€settlement€that€is:Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(1)€incorporated,€whether€or€not€merged,€intoÏa€divorce€decree;€andÐ ` x` x ÐÌÓÈäÓÓÓà  àà8 ` à(2)€subject€to€modification€under€ðð€8„103€ofÏthis€subtitle.Ð ` x` x ÐÌÓ4îÓà  àIn€general,€it€is€well€settled€that€the€ð ðdetermination€of€theÐ ¢(ò#. Ðeffective€date€of€a€modification€order€is€within€the€discretion€ofÏthe€trial€court.ðð€€¢Fader£,€òòsupraóó,€ðð€4„9(c),€at€178„179.€€TheÐ Â+'2 Ðtreatise€further€states€that€it€is€ð ðnot€an€abuse€of€discretion€forÐ ° Ða€chancellor€to€make€alimony€.€.€.€retroactive€to€the€date€on€whichÏa€petition€for€modification€is€filed€.€.€.€.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€179.€€DespiteÐ Ð  Ðappelleeððs€contention,€however,€we€cannot€find€any€statutoryÏprovision€that€expressly€limits€the€courtððs€discretionary€power€toÐ ð @ Ðòòmodifyóó€alimony€retroactive€to€a€date€prior€to€the€request€forÐ € Ð  Ðmodification.€€Ìà  àTo€be€sure,€logic€suggests€that€if€an€initial€alimony€awardÏcannot€be€made€retroactive€to€a€date€prior€to€the€filing€of€requestÏfor€alimony,€then€a€modification€of€alimony€cannot€be€madeÏretroactive€to€a€date€that€precedes€the€filing€of€such€a€request,Ïunless€the€parties€otherwise€agree.€€On€the€other€hand,€¢F.L.£€ðð€11„¼107€expressly€authorizes€a€modification€of€the€ð ðamount€of€alimonyÐ pÀ Ðawarded€as€circumstances€and€justice€require,ðð€without€the€expressÐ P Ðlimitation€that€governs€an€initial€alimony€award.€€òòSee€óó¢F.L.£€ðð€11„Ð à Ð106(a)(2).€€Ìà  àWe€can€easily€envision€a€situation€when€justice€andÏcircumstances€might€warrant€a€modification€to€a€date€preceding€aÏrequest€submitted€to€the€court.€€For€example,€an€¢obligor£€spouseÏseriously€injured€in€a€car€accident,€languishing€in€a€hospital€andÏunable€to€work,€might€not€be€in€a€position€to€request€aÏmodification€of€alimony,€while€failing€to€make€payment€afterÏpayment.€€By€the€time€a€request€is€finally€submitted€to€the€court,Ïthe€¢payor£€spouse€may€have€accumulated€substantial€arrears,€with€noÏprospect€of€suitable€employment.€€In€that€circumstance,€the€court,Ïin€its€discretion,€might€opt€to€reduce€the€past€due€alimonyÐ À+'2 Ðpayments,€which€the€statute€does€not€preclude.€€Even€if€theÏstatutory€gap€or€omission€in€the€modification€provision€wasÏinadvertent,€however,€it€is€the€Legislatureððs€function,€not€ours,Ïto€remedy€it.€€Ìà  àWe€have€found€only€one€case€in€the€past€25€years€that€shedsÏany€light€on€the€precise€issue€raised€here.€€The€case€supports€theÏview€that€the€court€has€discretion€to€modify€alimony€retroactive€toÏa€date€prior€to€the€actual€request.€€In€òòLevin€v.€Levinóó,€60€Md.€App.Ð  ð  Ð325€(1984),€we€addressed€the€issue€of€whether€the€trial€courtÏabused€its€discretion€in€modifying€an€alimony€obligationÏretroactive€to€a€date€preceding€the€husbandððs€petition€to€modifyÏalimony.€€There,€a€husband€and€wife€entered€into€a€separationÏagreement,€in€which€the€husband€agreed€to€pay€the€wife€alimonyÏequal€to€twenty„five€percent€of€his€gross€ð ðincomeðð€as€defined€in€theÐ P Ðagreement.€€Eleven€years€later,€in€May€1982,€the€husband€retired,Ïafter€receipt€in€April€1982€of€a€lump€sum€pension€payment€ofÏ$142,112.31€from€his€employment.€€Thereafter,€by€letter,€theÏhusband€notified€his€former€wife€that€his€retirement€terminated€hisÏalimony€obligation.€€Consequently,€the€wife€initiated€a€contemptÏproceeding€to€enforce€alimony€payments.€€Approximately€elevenÏmonths€after€the€husband€received€the€pension€funds,€he€filed€aÏpetition€to€modify€his€alimony€obligation.€€At€the€time€the€husbandÏreceived€the€pension€funds,€however,€the€original€alimony€order€wasÏin€effect.€€The€trial€court€ordered€the€husband€to€continue€paymentÏof€alimony,€but€the€court€reduced€the€amount,€effective€as€of€hisÏretirement€months€earlier.€€Ð À+'2 Ðà  àOn€appeal,€the€wife€claimed€that€she€was€entitled€to€the€fullÏamount€of€alimony€due€under€the€original€order€(i.e.,€25%€of€theÏpension),€because€the€husband€received€the€funds€eleven€monthsÏprior€to€filing€a€petition€for€modification.€€The€Court€noted€thatÏthe€wife€ð ðargues€that€the€court€lacked€the€authority€to€giveÐ ð @ Ðretroactive€effect€to€the€modification€order,€passed€on€13ÏSeptember€1983,€changing€past€due€installments€of€the€husbandððsÏalimony€payments.ðð€€We€agreed€with€the€trial€court€that€the€pensionÐ  ð  Ðconstituted€income,€but€upheld€the€trial€courtððs€modification€ofÏalimony€retroactive€to€April€1982,€eleven€months€prior€to€theÏfiling€of€the€petition€for€modification.€€In€reaching€that€result,Ïthe€Court€said€ð ðthat€the€determination€of€the€effective€date€of€aÐ à0 Ðmodification€order€is€within€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court,ððÐ pÀ Ðòòid.óó€at€335,€and€noted€that€the€wife€had€ð ðoverlooked€.€.€.€the€powerÐ P Ðof€the€court€to€do€precisely€what€she€contends€it€cannot€do€.€.€.Ð à Ð.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€335„336.€€Thus,€we€found€ð ðno€abuse€of€discretion€in€theÐ  p Ðretroactivity€portion€of€the€courtððs€order.ðð€€60€Md.€App.€at€œ336.›€Ð °  ÐThe€effect€of€the€ruling€was€to€change€the€amount€of€the€husbandððsÏalimony€obligation€after€the€fact,€and€as€of€a€time€prior€to€hisÏrequest€for€a€modification.€Ìà  àAt€the€time€suit€was€filed€in€òòLevinóó,€modification€of€alimonyÐ ð#@( Ðwas€governed€by€Md.€Ann.€Code€(1957,€1981€Repl.€Vol.),€Art.€16,€ððÏ5.€€It€said,€in€relevant€part:ÌÓÓà8  à[¢U]pon£€the€motion€of€either€party,€the€amount€of€alimonyÏawarded€under€this€title€is€subject€to€modification€asÏthe€circumstances€and€justice€may€require.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓøÓ¢F.L.£€ðð€11„107(b)€was€in€effect€as€of€October€1984,€and€the€case€wasÐ À+'2 Ðdecided€in€November€1984.€€In€any€event,€¢F.L.£€ðð€11„107(b)€containsÏlanguage€that€is€substantively€identical€to€the€earlier€statutoryÏlanguage.€€Ìà  àBy€analogy,€appellee€contends€that€òòReese€v.€¢Huebschman£óó,€50€Md.Ð ` ° ÐApp.€709€(1982),€and€¢F.L.£€ðð€12„104€support€her€position€thatÏappellant€is€expressly€prohibited€from€obtaining€a€modification€ofÏalimony€retroactive€to€a€date€prior€to€his€request.€€òòReeseóóÐ `  Ðconcerned€child€support,€and€¢F.L.£€ðð€12„104(b)€specifically€barsÏretroactive€modification€of€child€support€award€ð ðprior€to€the€dateÐ 0€  Ðof€the€filing€of€the€motion€for€modification.ðð€€Ms.€Langston€Ð À Ðoverlooks€the€express€statutory€provision€that€governs€modificationÏof€child€support,€as€well€as€the€strong€policy€considerations€inÏfavor€of€prohibiting€retroactive€modification€of€child€support€toÏa€date€prior€to€the€actual€modification€request.€€òòSee€Reuter€v.Ð P ÐReuteróó,€102€Md.€App.€212,€240„41€(1994).òò€óóÐ à Ðà  àBecause€we€find€no€statutory€support€for€appelleeððs€claim€thatÏthe€effective€date€of€alimony€modification€may€not€precede€theÏactual€filing€of€a€request,€it€follows€that€the€in€banc€panel€erredÏin€concluding€that,€as€a€matter€of€law,€the€court€cannot€make€aÏmodification€retroactive€to€a€date€prior€to€the€filing€of€aÏrequest.€€The€question€of€retroactivity€is€one€for€the€trial€judge,Ïin€the€exercise€of€discretion.€€Ìà  àIn€this€case,€the€trial€court€did€not€exercise€discretion€inÏmaking€the€alimony€modification€retroactive,€because€he€erroneouslyÏdetermined€that€the€parties€agreed€upon€modification€€retroactiveÏto€the€time€when€appellantððs€income€declined.€€Moreover,€appellantÐ À+'2 Ðdid€not€present€evidence,€apart€from€the€agreed€upon€reduction€inÏincome,€to€justify€a€court€ordered€modification€retroactive€to€MayÏ1998,€when€he€first€reduced€his€alimony€payment.€€Therefore,€weÏshall€remand€this€matter€to€the€court€for€further€proceedings,€inÏorder€for€the€court€to€decide,€in€its€discretion,€the€effectiveÏdate€of€the€modification€of€alimony.Ìà  àFor€the€benefit€of€the€trial€court€on€remand,€we€hasten€to€addÏthat,€in€exercising€its€discretion€in€matters€of€this€kind,€a€trialÏjudge€should€be€wary€of€permitting€a€modification€of€alimonyÏretroactive€to€a€date€that€precedes€a€request€to€the€court.€€As€weÏsee€it,€principles€of€equity€require€compelling€circumstances€toÏjustify€such€a€request.€€This€is€because€modification€of€alimonyÏretroactive€to€a€date€that€precedes€the€request€could€cause€extremeÏhardship€to€the€payee€spouse,€whose€first€notice€of€a€problem€mayÏcome€only€with€the€petition.€€By€that€time,€the€payee€spouseÏprobably€would€have€incurred€expenses€or€made€expenditures€based€onÏalimony€payments€already€received,€or€overdue€but€nonethelessÏanticipated€in€the€future.€€It€is€the€filing€of€a€modificationÏrequest€that€ordinarily€alerts€the€payee€spouse€that€a€change€mayÏbe€in€the€wind.€€By€then,€it€would€be€too€late€for€the€payee€spouseÏto€cancel€or€adjust€expenses€already€incurred.€€Moreover,€as€aÏmatter€of€policy,€unless€such€rulings€are€founded€on€extremeÏhardship,€the€court€would€act€to€encourage€the€kind€of€ð ðself€helpððÐ '`", Ðby€an€¢obligor£€spouse€that€we€ought€not€to€countenance,€absent€anÏagreement€between€the€parties.€€ññ¢ñÌññ¢ññó¢ñÌñó¢ñÐ À+'2 Ðò òòòÓÓà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àóóJUDGMENT€OF€THE€IN€BANC€REVIEW€PANELÐ ° ÐAFFIRMED€IN€PART€AND€VACATED€INÏPART.€€CASE€REMANDED€TO€THE€TRIALÏCOURT€FOR€FURTHER€PROCEEDINGS.€ÏCOSTS€TO€BE€DIVIDED€BETWEEN€THEÏPARTIES.€ó óòò